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PREFACE 
The present study attempts to explore , both theoretically 
and empiri c ally, some implications that a personal 
consideration of death may have for the way we live our 
l ives . 
Existential - Phenomenology has concerned itself with the 
description of the dimensions of human existence. I t is 
in this enquiry that Death , and through it, human finitude , 
emerges as an important dimension of existence . I t is not 
the fact of death itself , but the MEANl~~ it has for our 
lives which may be of important consequence. It is to 
this area that this research addresses itself. 
The methodology employed arlses out of a concern to 
contribute to the establishment of Psychology as a Human 
Science . To this end , a c hapter focusing on the philo -
sophical bases of methodology lS included . 
It is hoped that this study may , however little , c ontribute 
both to the field of Thanatology as well as to the more 
theoret i cal issue of what Psychology is, and where it is 
going . 
"Who am I , 
this person to die? 
Where and when was he , 
who asked it?" 
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1 Human Finitude: 
A DEFINING DI MENSION OF HUMAN EX I STENCE . 
1. 1 The Meaning of Death in Western Te c hnological Society . 
In a c omplex culture l ike western technological society , 
de a th appears within a conte x t of ambi va lent mean i ngs. 
As Merton has pointed out, "items of c ulture must be 
re c ognised to have multiple consequences." (Merton in 
Donaldson, 1971, p. 289). This section attempts to show 
that arising out of this ambivalent context of meanings , 
is a socia l stru c ture which e n c ourages indiv i dua l death -
denial a s a strategy of living while allowing a n impersonal 
' death-as-an-event ' to be a c knowledged. 
It has been noted by various writers (Fu l ton , 1965; 
Feifel , 1963 ; Becker , 1973 ) that dea t h has be c ome a 
tabooed subject in modern society. This v i ewpoint may be 
summarised as follows: 
"I n the twent i eth century death seems to have 
usurped the role that sex he l d during the 
Victorian era as a fundamental, powerful , 
universal experience , a bout which li tt l e is 
said . I n our culture death just as the 
Victorian Sex seems to be deliberately and 
consistently shunted to the periphery of our 
conscious awareness. " 
(Guthrie, 1971, p. 299 ) 
This viewpoint notes the euphemism with which we talk 
about death as 'passing on ', or as ' having joined the 
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departed' . It notes the common linguistic phrase: 'i f 
I die ' rather than ' when I die' as pointing to an avoidance 
of the inevitability of death. This viewpoint also cites 
the contrast between western technological s ociety and the 
more 'primitive' societies by which children in modern 
society are spared the ac knowledgement of the dead at 
funerals and how , in primitive societies, dying occurs 
within the home context of the entire family and lineage. 
It is further noted how western technology attempts to 
prolong life a t all costs even to the digni t y - denying 
degree of keeping people technically alive alth ough any 
possibility of living in a hum a n sense is negated. 
The placement of the a ged in old age homes indicates a 
distance of those near death from the everyday concern of 
the living. What we se e around us, is the permanence of 
concrete buildings and progressive indu strial growt h . 
We stress tradition, the ma nagement hierarchy, the sports 
club--being part of something larger which persists beyond 
us, to the ironic degree of dy i ng for our country so that 
'we' may l ive. All these things and many more, it is s a id, 
indica te a society where death has become a tabooed subject 
in order th at its r eality may be den ie d as far a s possible. 
On the other hand, other writers (Schneiderman, 1969; 
Parso ns and Lidz, 1967 ) put fo r ward the thesis that an 
awarene ss of death is prevalent in a modern techno l ogi cal 
so ciety suc h as the United St ate s of America. In this 
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view, man lives with the possibility of global annihilation. 
The reporting of the occurrence of death and dangerous 
activities take up a considerable amount of space in the 
mass media. Parsons, in his concern to show social 
structures as tending towards organic order, emphasi s es the 
ability of society to accommodate the occurrence of death. 
"American society has institutionalised a broadly 
s table, though flexible and changing orientation 
to death, that is fundamentally not a 'denial' 
but a mode of acceptance appropriate t o our primary 
cultural patterns of activism." 
(Parsons and Lidz in Donaldson, 1972, p. 288) 
In a study comparing American attitudes toward death in 1970 
and thirty-five years previous to this, Lester (1970) found 
that students in 1970 appear to be more preoccupied with 
thoughts of death than students in 1935, although the 
affe c tive reaction appeared to have changed little . 
It is postulated that this apparent disparity of viewpoints 
is not c o ntradictory but rather reflects the ambivalent 
meanings that the word 'death' has come to have in a complex 
society. These meanings must be explicitly clarified 
before meaningful empirical research may be done on the 
issue of death - denial. 
Death as a 'ge neralised event in the collective lives of men' 
is very different from death as relevant to one's personal 
life in terms of the 'annihilation of self'. The meaning 
of death in the former case occurs within a social context 
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which, as 'social organism' has a c oherent l ife of its own 
within which death occurs as part of the flow of its life. 
Here, taking a socio l ogical and collective perspective Man 
may be highly aware of 'd e ath - as - an ~ event' as a general 
category unrelated to his personal death . 
Death as 'annihilation of self ' , however, o c curs within a 
very persona l context which emphasises a unique life- history . 
The structure of the meaning of death as a general event may 
paradoxically decrease emphasis on death as personal destiny 
because of the shift of focus in the meaning of death. 
That is, as a person 1S encouraged to view death in non -
personal contexts, more personal conte x ts of death recede 
into the background. Thus western, technological society 
may encourage individual death - denial by emphasising death-
as - an - event in c ollecti v e l ife and by de - emphasising death 
as personal destiny . This differen c e in meaning has been 
noted in the Existential Literature as the distinc tion 
between 'deatb..,of ~y'sel!' and ' death of another': 
"By means of the semantic and linguistic confusion 
between the death~~sel f and the death of 
another, we protec t ourse l ves from the tremendous 
and dangerous amount of anxiety that is released 
when we are confronted with the phenomenologically 
accurate recognit i on of the meaning of our own 
death . .. . We hopefully maintai n that death of 
another is the only kind of death there is. 
In fact, we think of the death of myself as nothing 
worse than the death of another. We believe that 
the death of another is characteristic of all forms 
of death, even our own. Through this device, we 
hide from ourselves the true and demolishing nature 
of our own anxiety about and tragedy of our own 
death. " 
(Koestenbaum, 1971, p. 118) 
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Thus western technological society may be seen as a structure 
which allows us as individuals to escape from the imminence 
of 'death of m~eli' into the impersonal dimensions of 'death 
of another'. Given these meanings of death, an explicit 
clarification of the ambivalent dialogue between the individual 
and society in relation to the meaning of death may now be 
attempted. 
Much of what we are doing in western technological society is 
given meaning by an ethic of all-consuming proportions: 
progress. This ethic of progress puts us as individuals 
in a strange and anxiety-filled position. If we are to 
acknowledge 'progres s ' as an important ethic, then by some 
means o r other, we must reconcile this ethic with the fact 
that, as i ndividuals, we die. That lS, 'progress' as an 
ethic only applies conditionally to our individual lives. 
But 'progress ' to the world, mankind, technology and any 
other c onceptual groupings of trans-perso nal pursuits remains 
meaningful. In order to make our individual lives meaningful 
within this c ontext, the importance of individual death must 
be diminished or denied in favour of the importance of 
'progress' . It would even be better if the meaning of death 
becomes subsumed under the progressive ethic. Thu s death -
as-an-event be c omes part of the progressive march of things. 
In the mass media, we read of death as having a purpose: 
assassinations of politicians and martyrs for the sake of 
their cause; buddhist monks burning themselves to death; 
the threat of an atomic bomb as the sanction for the progress 
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of political ideals; the businessman ' working himself to 
death' for the financial progress of his family. In this 
way, western society indeed acknowledges death, but in such 
a way as to transform it into the life of progress. 
Thus, in western technological society, death - as - an-event 
is acknowledged and may serve as a substitute for 'death of 
myself' as the meaning of death in the lives of men. 
1.2 The ImE£rtance~~Defini~ the Phenomenon of Stu~~ 
Thanatology. 
A deeper enquiry into the distinction between 'death of 
myself' and 'death of another' may expose another confusion 
in the study of death and dying. That is, because of the 
lack of acknowledgement in the distinction of these two 
different meanings that death has come to have, it is very 
difficult to assess whether researchers in Thanatology are 
studying attitudes towards death as authentically encountered 
('dea!b_of~elf') or as vicariously encountered ('death of 
~~elf as death of another '). 
Peter Koestenbaum has noticed the essential characteristic 
of 'death of another' as being part of the flow of one's life : 
"The death of others is, first of all, an occurrence 
within the world. We conceive of the world as 
going on. We may think of funeral arrangements, 
tearful scenes, maybe a funeral oration, the settling 
of the estate, and the like. The death of another 
means the cessation of heartbeats, the cessation of 
respiration ; in general, it means the termination 
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of all bodily processes.... What is characteristic 
about the meaning of the death of another is that 
it involves the elimination of an object within the 
~orl~and not of the observing ego or subject. 
In other words, if a man examines closely--that is, 
phenomenologically--what he means by the death of 
a nother person, he recognises that ~_himseli is 
still in the~cture: he is the observer conte m-
plating the s cene, even if the scene is only in his 
imagination. Death is an event within the world, 
while the life-world -- the world of human experience--
perdures.!I 
(Koestenbaum, 1971, p. 254) 
In an authenti c encounter with the meaning of death, 'death 
of myself' may be thought of in terms of the meanings of 
'death of another'. Thus when encountering one's own death, 
one may not face the impact of annihilation or possible 
nothingness, the dissolution of all re lat ionsh ips which go to 
make up the 'self' as it is experienced, but rather one may 
take the stance of an external observer watching one ' s own 
death in the world. Here, one may imagine one's own funeral, 
the reactions of loved ones, and the stil lness of one's dead 
body. In this way 'dea1~~~eli' becomes 'death of another ' 
and the gravity of authentic 'death o~self' is lost. 
In an aut henti c encounter with the ' death of m.v.self', with 
death, dea1b comes, rather than life. This is not to be seen 
as a stance on a 'life-after-death' issue, but rather an 
analysis of the different ways in which people encounter the 
event of death in their lives. 
the actor rather than the a udien ce; for the first a nd only 
time, the actor. The aloneness of this condition i s very 
different from the shared condition in which we all 
experience the 'death of another'. Only the unique person 
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may experience the 'death of myself' -- no - one else ca n do it 
for one. 'Death of~elf' thus shows itself in a very 
different me ani ng - context than 'death - of - myself -a s - death - of 
another' . Thus, to confuse the two meanings, as though one 
were studying a single discrete phenomenon, is to be mistaken. 
Many studies have been carried out to observe the attitudes 
people have towards death (Lester, 1970; Kahana, 1971; 
Krieger et aI, 1974, amongst others). However, few have any 
procedure which may elicit whether the people are responding 
in terms of an authentic meaning of personal death ('~at~ 
of~self ') or an inauthentic one ('death of myself as another '). 
Thus Ray and Najman (1974 ), postulate the importance of a 
death denial scale as part of death attitude studies . 
For example ; so called 'death anxiety' can only be evaluated 
in terms of whether the person is fa c ing ' death of myself ' or 
not . A person not experiencing 'death anxiety' may not 
necessarily have 'accepted' death as it is often theor ise d but 
rather be con fronting a death which is ' not really there' 
for him. Thus the phenomenon to be studied in term s of its 
meaning - context must be clearly defined rather than an 
assumption of the meaning of death, as encountered by different 
people, as being the same basic phenomenon . 
1.3 Death Confrontation as Awareness of Finitude. 
Death itself, as an event, must be differentiated from its 
sense of anticipation which constitutes an awareness of 
finitude. Awareness of finitude most lucidly defines the 
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meaning that death has for our everyday lives. Death itself 
is not finitude but rather gives us our finitude and the 
possible awareness of it. Here we are concerned with the 
meaning of life as dialogued with death. Death is a future 
event in our lives which we can only anticipate, but its 
meaning in terms of our everyday lives is potentially 
present. Meaning ~s the way in which future and past events 
relate themselves to the present. Thus Hooper and 5pilka 
(1970) found evidence to support the notion that one's 
present beliefs and behaviours are a function of perspectives 
on time and death. 
In revealing our finitude to us, death as an empirical event 
becomes a metaphor for the ontological experience of 'giving 
up what we have embodied' and an acknowledgement of change. 
It is in this spirit that Keleman (1974) focuses on the 
meaning that death has for our lives and thus exposes fini-
tude as a dimension of human existence. 'Dying' in this 
sense is then not just an empirical event but a ' language' 
which allows us to understand the boundaries within which we 
live. Death, in being the final limit, makes the meaning of 
lesser limits clear. 
It is th~ postulation of this thesis that an awareness of 
finitude as given by a confrontation with 'death of myself' 
is an important field of study independent of the study of 
attitudes toward death-as - an-event and the study of terminally 
ill people. Awareness of finitude is concerned with the 
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meaning of life and the way we live our lives rather than 
the narrower subject of our attitudes toward death, which 
is nevertheless related, but different in focus. Awareness 
of finitude through confrontation of death is equally applic -
able to those both near and far from actual death. It is 
thus concerned with the quality of our lives rather than an 
explicit consideration of the dying. The following analysis 
suggests a relationship between the confrontation of death 
and terminally ill people. 
1.4 Death Confrontation and the Terminal!y~ll. 
It has been noted that a person's style of dying is similar 
to his style of living (Pattison, 1977; Weisman, 1972). 
Thus someone whose strategy towards life involved lack of 
responsibility in regard to what happened to him (i.e. to 
blame others or the environment) would also adopt this 
strategy in his dying to a marked degree. 
Koenig (1973) criticises KUbler - Ross' five-stage theory, 
in which terminally ill patients pass through phases of 
denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance. 
He notes that KUbler-Ross assumes that all the patients are 
responding to an active confrontation with death. However, 
Koenig (1973) found that terminally ill people most often 
encounter the loss of their life as a function of the 
progression of their disease. They cannot be said to be 
actively 'confronting death' but rather 'receding from life' 
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Thus people's style of dying mayor may not be concerned 
with an explicit confrontation of death. I n fact, Koenig 
(1973) suggests that the concerns of the terminally ill are 
fundamentally related to existing possible levels of well-
being rather than death confrontation. 
" death lS not always the main concern of the dying 
person. Dependency, isolation, pain, physical 
disfiguration , and fear of abandonment are among 
the issues that are sometimes as threatening, if 
not more so , than impending death." 
(Koenig, 1 973, p. 181) 
Given this, a nd given the relationship between styles of 
living and styles of dying, it follows that if people have 
not come to terms with human finitude earlier in life , it is 
made difficu l t in terminal phases of illness where more 
immediate concerns are often confronted. In such cases, 
most benefit would occur by working on family communication 
patterns, body image, sharing of feelings of loneliness and 
isolation, and only then, if the individual lS ready, should 
a discussion facilitating the confrontation of death be 
embarked upon . It may be noted in passing, that only those 
people who have confronted their own finitude may adequately 
deal with terminally ill people in an empathic and human 
manner . Much of the depersonalised treatment of terminally 
ill people, in discouraging human contact and in keeping 
patients uninformed as to their condition, may be seen to 
have arisen out of the threat medical personne l experience 
about death. It is thus timely of the Thanatology movement 
to have questioned the bounds of medical relevance. In this 
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view , there come s a stage in which a person's dying is no 
longer a medical matter with possible med ical solutions but 
a spiritua l or psychological matter in which a person's human 
cont ext be comes important as a meaningful completi on to life. 
It has thus been seen how the study of the dying lS not 
necessarily the study of awareness of finitude. Indeed, 
awareness of finitude is most lucidly experienced through a 
direct confrontation with 'death of myself'; but su c h a 
confrontation emerges as part of the structure of human 
existence and may arise in many different contexts. 
Victor Frankl has noted the importance of finding meaning in 
life as constituting a prime motivating potential in the 
lives of men. In questioning the meaningfulness of our live s, 
many of us are c onfronted b y death as a comment on our lives, 
which is independent from the imm inenc e of actual death. 
It is this encounter (in the previous and other possible 
contexts) that may be shown to be of great import for the way 
we live our lives . Far from being a ' morbid subject', it 
may be shown that an awareness of finitude through confront -
ation with death may hold an important key to improving the 
quality and authenticity of our existence. 
1.5 Awareness of Finitude and Human Existence. 
Whereas Freud and other intrapsychic psychologists see man's 
life as being stru ctur ed largely by the past, Existential-
Phenomenolog ists a ck now l edge the meaning which the future 
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gives to the structure of Man ' s life as well. That is, in 
giving meaning to our lives, we include a future which may 
make our present action, feelings, and viewpoints intelligible. 
In relating himself to the future, Man fa c es death and thus 
the finitude of his existence. Freud (1960), however, 
essential ly saw a relatedness to death as originating not 
in a confrontation with the futurity of death itself but in 
the universality of castration, or separation, anxiety. 
Thus death, in this view, does not confront one directly 
but rather arises out of early childhood experience. 
"to interpret thanatophobia as castration or 
separation anxiety, or the need for an idealised 
union with a symbolic "other", is to substitute 
historicity when contemporaneity or futurity is 
i ndicated. " (Burton, 1971 p. 294) 
But ... 
Even when Fr eud later postulated a death instinct in man's 
psyche, this impulse was rooted in a yearning for the 
individual to return to the primordia l unity of the mother's 
womb. Thus the meaning of death is not treated directly as 
a phenomenon in its own right i n Freudian literature but rather 
as a reminder of past experience. Erikson (1959) has noted 
that the final crisis in the developmental psychology of 
the individual lS the acceptance of one's life as a whole 
as facilitated by the imminence of death, but he confines 
this stage largely to old age. I t is thus left to 
Existential-Phenomenology to clarify the nature of finitude 
as a defining dimension of human existence. Following, is 
the outline of a thesis inspired by Existential writers 
whi c h suggests the relationship between human existence 
and awareness of finitude: 
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Anima ls and p l ants come into being, and after a while, die. 
It would be mere specula tion, however, to claim that they 
e x perienced themselves clearly as finite beings; that is, 
as beings who anticipated a personal death. Man, however , 
is unique in that he is not c ontained by the moment - to - moment 
vicissitudes of being; he embodies a future and a past in 
each successive moment which may be transformed according 
to his present relatedness to the wo r ld. Man thus does not 
just 'live when he lives and dies when he dies' but i s 
re l ated to death as being the boundary on the horizon of 
his life. Heidegger has chara c terised Man ' s e x istence as a 
being - toward - death. This viewpoint asserts that Man must 
actively acknowledge his finitude if an authentic existence 
is to be achieved. In this view, to regard death as a morbid 
subje c t to be avoided is to rob life of its supreme value: 
intensity . It is with this understanding that Koestenbaum 
(1971) c haracterises the sense of confronting the '£eath -
of~self ' as having vitality. In being c onfronted with the 
inevitability and inesc a pability of the 'death- of - myself' one 
immediately experiences anguish Dr dread from the threat of 
non - being. Such anguish is the price one pays for confront -
ing the existential realities of l ife. It is not the final 
response to awareness of finitude but rather the immediate 
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pain of moving from the protection of unknowing ness and 
unawareness to an acknowledgement of the existential 
boundary of one's life. With such acknowledgement comes 
a new awareness of the intensity of life in relation to 
its possible non-being. 
"authentic success and happiness in human existence 
demand uncompromising realism; we must understand 
and acknowledge the facts of life. Paradoxically, 
the most vitalising fact of life is the utter 
inevitability of death! Man must constantly keep 
before his eyes the reality, the nature and the 
inevitability of that fact. He must make every 
effort to understand exactly what his own death 
means to him. He must see the consequences of the 
knowledge that he is mortal. He must never let go 
of this insight." (Koestenbaum, 1971, p. 26) 
Such confrontation with 'death-of-myself' lS just as rele-
vant to religious people who believe in an immortal soul, 
because death confrontation is not concerned with what 
speculatively happens at death but rather with the experience 
of feeling human and the definitive horizon of such humanity. 
Both religious and irreligious people confront death within 
an existing incarnate, interpersonal, temporal context and 
the boundary of this context appears existentially, as death, 
to both. It is thus interesting to note that Krieger et al, 
(1974) found no significant difference in the amount of 
threat shown by believers and non-believers in an afterlife, 
towards death. 
It lS also postulated that there is a subtle difference between 
a death-oriented existence and an existence which has embodied 
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a n awareness of finitude. In a death - oriented existen c e, 
one has confronted ' ~ath~~~lf' but then becomes 
preoccupied with death a s an event in one's life. One thus 
continues to experience anguish be c ause one is ' with ' de a th 
al l the time. Here , a c onsideration of de a th does not free 
one to live a meaningfu l l ife but rather inhibits such 
possibility. One's l ife is thus oriented towards death - as -
an - event and su c h orientation h i ghlights death rather than 
life. Awareness of f i nitude, on the other hand, a l though 
given by death - confrontation is a focus on life as finitely 
lived, rather than a preoccupation with death as an absurd 
end. One is no longer then ' with ' death as a negation of 
life but rather 'with' the meaning of life as dialogued with 
death. I n the immediate confrontation of death one 
e x periences angu i sh . This may either lead to a death -
oriented e x istence or an awareness of finitude which is not 
preoccupied with death as su c h. With the latter, one moves 
beyond the anguish of death confrontation to be i ng freed to 
the qua l ity of a finite existence ; in the former 'de a th -
£f - myse l f ' be c omes an anguished p r eoc c upation in whi c h life 
i s negated as a bsurd. This is t he essential differen c e 
between Sartre ' s and Heidegger's a ppro a ch to the phenomenon 
of death. In his wr itings Sartre (1956) focuses on de a th as 
breeding a death - oriented existen c e: 
"Death, in so far as it can be revea l ed to me, is 
not only the always possible a nn i ~ilat i on of my 
possibles .... It is also the triumph of the point 
of view of the Other .... The unique c haracteristic 
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of a dead life is that it is a life of which the 
Other makes himself the guardian .... To be dead 
is to be a prey for the living. This means there -
fore that the one who tries to grasp the meaning 
of his future death must discover himself as the 
future prey of others. We have here, therefore, a 
case of alienation." (Sartre, 1956, p. 546 ) 
Heidegger , although he does not explicitly acknowledge this 
difference, focuses on awareness of finitude as given by 
' death-of - myself' which moves beyond the angui s h of death -
confrontation in order to reveal the authentic mode of 
Dasein or human existence. It is largely Heidegger's 
insights which pave the way to an understanding of the 
relationship between awareness of finitude and authentic 
existence . I n confronting 'death-of-myself', say s Heidegger, 
personal individuality is achieved. I realise that I must 
face death alone and thu s truly experience the sense o f my 
own indiv i duality. Death, in being the one th i ng no - one 
e l s e can do for me, shows itself as the phenome n on which 
differentiates myself most lucidly f r om the destiny of 'das 
man' or people in general. Such a sense of individua li ty 
and aloneness in turn constitutes an awareness of personal 
responsibility in terms of my acts and choices. 
"Prior to Existential thought death did not have 
essentially i ndiv i dual significa nce; its 
sign i ficance was cosmic. Death had a function 
for which history or the cosmos had fi nal 
responsibili ty . Death did not belong to the 
person, it was c os mic property." 
(Harris , 1971, p . 227) 
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In confronting the 'death-of-myself' as a very personal 
experience, the significance of the uniqueness of my life 
also emerges. That which shows itself does not show itself 
in the very same manner to anyone else. Death will termi-
nate this unique existence. I thus become aware of the 
moment-to-moment, unique significance of my life-history. 
This gives meaning to personal existence in a way that 
science cannot. Science is supposedly concerned with the 
pursuit of knowledge. However, in viewing death in 
empirical terms, it excludes the possible meaning that 
'death-of-myself' may have for personal life. It is thus 
only with 'death-of-myself' as a personally encountered 
phenomenon that personal life emerges in its unique and 
individual sense. 
The sense of individuality as given by awareness of finitude 
carries with it implications for a realisation of personal 
freedom and responsibility. In standing alone in the face 
of my own death, I face a radical perspective concerning 
the ' ownness ' of my life : I f I, and only I, face my death, 
then my death gives to me my life as uniquely my own as 
well-- no - one else can answer for it just as no - one else can 
answer to my death. Thus in finding death as 'my own' I 
also find life as 'my own'. This makes me aware of the 
responsibility that I have for making choices; awareness 
of finitude shows me that only I can take ultimate respon -
sibility for my life and this frees me from the perspective 
of 'the other' or 'das man'. I n this encounter with 
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finitude, I then belong to myself and thus cann ot simply act 
as 'another' would without acknowledging the 'ownness' of 
being an experiencer. Every act or choice must then be 
acknowledged as an act or choice of personal responsibility 
i.e. the act or choice of 'myself'. Indeed whether e xpli-
citly acknowledged or not, a 'myself' is in fact the doer 
of my acts and the maker of my choices. It is, however, 
only in an authentic existence, according to Heidegger, that 
such an acknowledgement is explicitly recognised. That lS, 
we are free to recognise the dimensions of our existence 
or not. Thus Victor Frankl (1971) has noted that today our 
neurosls lS an attempt to obscure existential facts. We may 
live as though we are not finite beings or as though we are 
not personally the referent for our actions. Such modes of 
living carry with them the necessity of structuring a world 
which will support the unwillingness to acknowledge the 
dimensions of human existence. Such people must create modes 
of denial which constitute the anxiety of a potential 
invalidation of present life-style which arises out of the 
tension between the act of denial and that which must be 
denied. 
A further meaning of awareness of finitude concerns one ' s 
relationship to time. Here a sense of the urgency to act In 
the uniqueness of the personal flow of my life emerges: 
"I f man were immortal, he would be justified in 
delaying everything; there would be no need to 
do anything right now. Only under the urge and 
pressure of life's transcience does it make sense 
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to use the passing of time." (Frankl, 1971, p. 307) 
With awareness of finitude, the present takes on an urgent 
imperative. Again if I were to live i nauthent ically as 
though death was not a personal reality, the flow of time 
would assume an insignificance in terms of the aware ness of 
change. In fact, an awareness of change is i nh i bited because 
this would announce the inevitable imminence of death. 
I may then become obsessed with routine as if to de-emphasise 
the flow of time as change. Mu c h obsessive behav io ur can be 
seen to be concerned with an attempt to stop the flow of 
time and change. 
Awareness of finitude also heightens the quality of the 
present moment of being, in contrast to the possibility of 
non -being. I n terms of the possible 'n othingness' of non-
being, the present, as being immediately and undeniab ly 
't here ' becomes appreciated as a quality of existence which 
i s normally taken for granted. It s very obviousness, 
however, lS not that obvious in the light of death. 
Death in this relationship emerges as the 'gro und' by which 
the 'figure' of present-being is heightened. In an existence 
which is 'always there' on the other hand , the present moment 
be comes less sign ificant as the locus of e xperie nce. 
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So too, things in the world as well as the body take on their 
finitudinal characteristics with an authentic encounter with 
'death-of-myself' . The substantiality of things and my body 
becomes more ' there' as figure in terms of the ground of 
possible non - being. 
emerges. 
Thus a dialectic between life and death 
I n su c h a dialectic the totality of my life may be realised 
and thus a sense of resolution and completeness achieved. 
In confronting death I am in a sense, at the end of my life, 
where it is finished. In c onstituting my life in terms of 
the possibility of its completion, I am regarding my life 
as a totality. Such a perspective al l ows me to radically 
review what I am doing in terms of my life as a totality. 
Awareness of finitude thus gives a total context within which 
I may make goals, hold values, and find meaning. It is this 
total context that wi ll act as the intelligible just i f i ca -
tion for my life. Grounded in these insights Heidegger 
thus calls for an active living of our 'being-unto-death' 
{Sein -z um-Todel. It is only out of the cons c ious dialectic 
between life and death that Man may emerge as a totality and 
thus achieve an intelligible life. 
The previous implications of awareness of finitude for man's 
life should not be seen in terms of a c ausal chain which 
sets into motion one thing after another; rather the 
descriptions must be viewed in terms of their dialectic a l 
mutuality: 
the - world. 
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they all arise as a unitary mode of being - in -
The relationship between aw a reness of finitude 
and human e x istence may thus be summarised i n terms of the 
cohesive holism of a f i nite - embodied existence: 
I n a finite existence I emerge as a unique individual who 
is a l one in my freedom to make choices regarding my l i fe 
as a totality. I am also aware of the personal responsibility 
for my thoughts and actions yet I act courageously be c ause 
of the urgency and intensity of my life as given by my death. 
I am aware of my strength of personal integrity because of 
my willingness to confront the existential facts of life. 
My goals, values and de c isions are experienced as intellig -
ible in the light of the total project of my life as 
dialogued with my death. I n taking charge of my life, I 
do not unquestioningly rep l icate the lives, values and 
actions of others (das man), but assume personal responsibility 
for my values and actions. 
It is hoped that I have now delineated the focus of study, 
i.e. awareness of finitude through death - confrontation. 
I may now proceed to a description of an empirica l study 
which sought to clarify the phenomenon in a non-theoretical 
context from the actor - perspective. 
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2 Philosophical Basis 
of Methodology 
This chapter addresses itself to a number of contentious 
issues in Psychology, the resolution of which is cruc i al 
i f Psychology ~s a scientific discipline is to progress 
beyond its present lack of clarity as to what it is doing. 
These issues may be best stated in the form of questions: 
1. What is the relationship between Philosophy and Psy c ho -
logy? 
2. What should Psy c hology study? 
3. What methodological approaches are adequate to that which 
Psychology studies? 
These questions are obviously interrelated and any possible 
answer to one of these questions will have impl i cations for 
the other two whether explicitly acknowledged as such or 
not. The following discussion will attempt to throw some 
light on these questions and their possible answers in order 
to expose the rationale for this study's choice of approach , 
i.e. Existential-Phenomenology. 
2.1 The Natural - Scientific A~oach to Psychol09..\l.. 
The Natural - Scientific approach to Psychology may be seen 
essentially as a movement which claims to be fundamenta l ly 
methodological in its aims. That is, like other natural 
sciences such as Physics, Chemistry, etc., Psychology is 
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considered to be 'self-contained', having no roots or 
foundations outside itself, as in Galileo's claim for 
Euclidean Geometry. It wishes to say, together with other 
natural sciences , that, given its scientific basis and 
scientific modes of reasoning (induction, deduction, etc.) 
the relationship between Philosophy and the enterprise of 
Psychology is exhausted once the '~~ect' of stud~as~en 
isolated. 
It is this last phrase which exposes the basic assumption 
of Natural Science and its import for Psychology. The view -
point encouraged by this attitude is to study man or some 
part of man as one would study an object. An ob - ject is 
something which stands out as a discrete thing and which 
can be studied 'in itself' as defined by the spatio - temporal 
boundaries of Physics. Thus, if we wish to adapt this model 
to Psychology, we must find 'an object' to study. 
The response to this quest has been answered in various 
ways, all which will be shown to have started from the 
basic philosophical premise inherent in Natural Scientific 
methodology: i.e. to study objects. 
2.1.1 Descartes and the Dualistic Solution. 
Descartes' 'indubitable certainty of the cogito' as the 
answer to the quest for an absolute foundation of knowledge, 
offered to Psychology the 'thing' which Psychology should 
study-- the mind. In this world view, matter occupies space 
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as extension and this includes the body. The thinker, on 
the other hand does not occupy space and thus is of the 
mind. The body is a machine, the object of mechanics and 
obeys all the laws pertaining thereto, whereas the mind is 
not subject to physical laws. Here a split emerges between 
the physical and the mental, the healing of which has been 
a central quest for philosophers and psychologists ever 
since. Descartes himself was aware of the difficult 
situation of "a ttempting to answer the question of how two 
substances which are essentially not a unity can constitute 
an essential un ity . " (Luijpen, 1969, p. 52) 
Nevertheless, Psychology (Psyche-Logos) became the study 
of the mind or soul. I ntrapsychic Psychologists with vary-
ing degrees of philosophical contradiction attempted to 
study 'the mind' as its object having its own laws and 
internal coherence. 
Apart from its Philosoph ical problems, Cartesian Dualism 
left Natural Scientists in a difficult position. That is, 
although Descartes had isolated an 'object' for study by 
Psychology, as Natural Science would wish, the question of 
employing adequate scientific methodology was dubiously 
raised. Cartesian Dualism either encouraged introspection-
ism as the method of choice or the postulation of assumed, 
non-observable, inner structures inferred from people's 
beh avi our, verbal reports and dreams. A physical scientist 
would prefer an 'object' which is directly observable. 
2.1.2 The Solution of Central State Materialism. 
Central State Materialism reacts to Cartesian Dualism by 
offering the hypothesis that mental events and physical 
events in the brain are identical. Thus, in principle, 
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Psychology can be studied by the methods of neurophysiology, 
molecular biology and other approaches which may inform us 
of brain structures. The mind is no longer an invisible 
mind occupying no space but visibly observable and a mere 
scalpel's cut away. Here, Psychology , now subsumed under 
Biology has both an 'object ' to study and a natural scientific 
methodology by whi c h to do so. Central State Materialism 
reduces mental phenomena to physical phenomena, thus 
eliminating one side of Descartes' problem (mental events ) 
and achieving a monism of a physical universe, amenable to 
natural science, and adequate to a study of Man. 
In putting Man in his brain, however, Ce nt ral State 
Materialism maintains a dualism on another level-- it 
iso l ates a world within from a world without. The world lS 
represented inside one ' s head in varying degrees of 
clarity, one's contact with the world being dependent on 
these representations. Thus Man does not see the world but 
an image of the world in his brain. But who sees the image?; 
for to see an image another image of the image would have 
to be c reated. Apart from starting an infinite regress by 
which we never get back to the world, we find a dualistic 
sp l it between Man and the world on an ontological level. 
27 
In this approach to Psychology, the implicit Philosophical 
assumption would be that phenomena such as anger, anxiety, 
etc., are not what they appear to be but actually certain 
neurons firing in the brain in certain ways. Thus we would 
not look at anger in an interpersonal, historical context 
but in a brain context and this, it is claimed, would be 
logically adequate to understand what anger is. Central 
State Materialism, in finding an 'object' for Psychology to 
study, offers an explanation for phenomena, rather than the 
phenomena themselves as having coherent intel ligibility. 
2.1.3 The Solution of Behaviourism. 
Behaviourism mayor may not seek recourse to Central State 
Materialism for its ultimate rationale. It, however, moves 
away from a radical materialism by refusing to view the 
'mind' as a 'thing' but asserts that the 'mind' is a noun 
used to represent that which really is behaviour viewed from 
a mentalistic perspective. Merleau-Ponty acknowledges 
Watson, the founder of Behaviourism, for escaping the trap 
of Central State Materialism which confuses phenomena with 
brain -c odified representations of phenomena. 
"I t was sa id that behaviour was not localised in 
the central nervous system ... , that it resides 
between the individual and the environment ... 
and finally that it is concerned with a stream 
of activity which the living projects around 
itself." (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, in La Pointe, 
p. 238) 
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Merleau - Ponty does note, however, that although Behaviourism 
takes man out of his skull and puts him 'back into the world' , 
it still represents psychological phenomena in terms of a 
purely behavioural expression of su ch phenomena. Thus the 
phenomenon of anger is replaced by the necessary and suffic i ent 
environment a l conditions for anger a nd/or by a description 
of anger as operationally defined in behavioural terms, 
e.g. shout ing, baring of teeth, fist - shak i ng, etc . We thus 
will know what a person getting angry looks like or what 
environmental conditions are like l y t o provoke anger (given 
a belief of determinism ), but we still do not know what anger 
actually is. 
It is hoped that I have now exposed the diale c tic between 
the Natural Scientific ' zeitgeist' and its philosophical 
v i sions of man. I n Behaviourism, the results of behavioural 
studies will be understood in terms of i ts view of man ; 
so too with intrapsychic and physiolog ica l studies. Thus: 
" the possibility of an 
is indissolubly connected 
sophi ca l vision of ma n." 
emp irical human science 
with a certain philo-
(Strasser, 1963, p . 42 ) 
It should be noted, however, that some trends of thought 
(e.g. Gest al t Psychology ) have developed without clear philo-
sophical premises and have not been ex plicit in outlining 
their implicit view of man . I ntrapsych ic Psychologists 
(Freud, Jung, etc . ) also fall into th i s ca tegory and will be 
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found to oscillate between dualism and monism when 
expl ici tly examined. 
Up till now , the focus has been on that aspect of Natural -
Science which calls for the delineation of an ' object ' as 
't h i ng - in-itself' and its implications for understanding man. 
What will now be more closely examined 1S the~ in~ich 
natural science studies its ' ob~ct' once it has been 
2.2 The Construction of Questions in the Natural Sciences . 
" Man question s the world and the world responds 
according to the nature of the question." 
(Strasser, 1963, p. 114) 
In noting that a s cientific question must already have been 
raised before the scientist ca n observe facts, Strasser 
exposes an original concept ual manipulation of the data by 
the scientist. That is, the data is v i ewed according to 
categories impo sed by the scientist, and which have been 
originated according to the criterion of utility. Such 
categories from which the scientist views his data are 
causal relations, determined responses, and quantitative 
measurement of s pace and time . Thus, questions proposed 
within a natural scientific framework will be those which 
start : What ca uses ... , How long ... , How much ... , What 
law will X c o nform to, etc. There is nothing wrong with 
th es e questions as long as we acknowledge th at the answers 
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to them constitute only those profiles of the phenomenon 
manipulated to fit the question's mode . Physicists have 
recently become aware of this obvious fact in regard to the 
nature of matter. When addressing questions and experiments 
to matter in terms of the idea of 'light waves ', matter shows 
itself in 'light waves' terms; when addressing questions 
and experiments to the same 'matter' i n terms of the idea 
of 'particles', matter shows itself in ' particle' terms. 
Here the nature of the phenomenon is show i ng us that the 
nature of the question is obsolete . Thus , in a very real 
sense, the Natural Sciences do not find f act s but construct 
them according to their utilitarian appropriateness. 
Steiner Kvale (1977), in an article entitled "The Techno -
logica l Paradigm of Psychological Research " goes even 
further to say that at the root of Pos i tiv i sm and the 
Natural Scientific approach to psychological research, lies 
a technological ethic. The ethic of technological planning 
requires "control over object i f i ed processes and strict 
prediction of future behaviour" (Kvale, 1973, p . 147), and 
as such, wishes to fit the behaviour of individuals and 
groups into this framework. 
Although it is difficult to see this as the primary motive 
of Natural - Scientific research in Psychology, it i s possible 
to see how the Natural Scientific 'zeitgeist' reifies such 
technological objectives. 
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It may prove insightful to examine the utilitar ia n world -
view upon which Scientific questions are based. If we are 
interested in phenomena as being usable, in what context 
should they appear? Essentially, something whi ch we have 
no explanation for becomes useful when we relate it i n some 
way to things already explained. Thus we wil l focus on that 
profile of the phenomenon which may be reduced to terms 
which address themselves to our existing needs. However, 
it would be naive to propose that the profile elicited in 
this way lS an adequate description of the phenomenon itself. 
The importance of this may seem trivial when considering 
Natural Sciences such as Physics and Chemistry where the 
'object' of study has been clearly defined. But in 
Psychology where it has been shown that the 'object' is far 
from clear, one must be very careful what questions one 
puts to human phenomena. If the k i nd of questions asked 
are borrowed from the natural sciences (viz. calculability, 
causal relations), we have precludec the possibility that 
the nature of man may show qualities which are different 
from natural scientific objects right from the start. 
Within the Natural-Scientific framework a self-c onstituted 
cycle has been generated which dces not have recourse to 
anything outside itself. The methodological findings will 
be constituted according to the vis i on of mar which again 
is reified by its methodology. I t pats itself on the back. 
Given this relationship, the importance of philosophical 
32 
assumptions emerge as the prime focus of concern, as we both 
begin and end with the philosophical view of Man. Thus the 
question which emerges is: What constitutes an adequate view 
of Man? Any possible answer to this question will have to 
begin with a valid approach to the question which does justice 
to its magnitude. 
2.3 ' Understandi~~~~the Path~~~Ade~ate View of Man. 
If we are not to begin with questions borrowed from the natural 
sciences, it becomes important that we begin our approach to 
the study of Man with a 'willingness to understand' rather 
than a 'concern to explain'. That is, we will not approach 
the phenomenon of Man with or iginal preconceptions such as 
the hypothesis of a 'mind', or accordi ng to primarily 
methodologica l con siderations of observability, testability, 
etc. 
Rather we would, as much as po ssible, be concerned to allow 
the phenomenon to 'speak for i tsel f' . It lS to this concern 
that Husserl originally addressed himself in his dictum 
'back to the things themselves'. As early as 1894, Dilthey , 
in ca lling for a humanistic psychology, proclaimed 'u nder -
standing ' in contra st to 'explanation' as the pr eferred 
approach of inquiry. He did not, however, develop his theme, 
and the resultant worldview, as thoroughly as Husserl. who 
outlined the beginnings of a phenomenology which he claimed 
would result in a more rigorous foundation for knowledge. 
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Jacob Needleman has adequately expressed this attitude of 
understanding demanded by Phenomenology : 
"T o understand a n entity, phenomenon, idea, or 
exper i en c e, is to approach the object to be 
understood on i ts terms, to s ee in it struc tures 
that emerge from its s i de and not from ours. " 
(Need l eman, 1963, p. 38) 
Here the im portant requirement of faithfu l des cri ption may 
be noted : 
" Th e d ecisive factor lie s before all in the absolutely 
fa it hful desc ri ption of that whic h rea lly l ies 
before one in phenome nolog ical pur i ty, a nd in keeping 
at a d i stan ce all i nterp re t ations that tra nscend the 
g iv en ." (Husserl i n Needleman, 1963, p. 38 ) 
It i s only with th is attitude that the possibility of a view 
of Man may emerge wh ic h adequately conforms to the magnitude 
of wh a t Man i s beyond the boundaries of the limiting questions 
asked by Natura l Science. 
' Exp l anation ', the method of inquiry of Natural Sc i ence , 
on the other hand, involve s a t r ansformation of the phenomenon 
which is often based ( especially in t he case of Psychology) 
o n a partial un derstanding of the phenomenon. This is not 
as impo r tant i n Na tural Sc i en c es su c h as Physics and Chemi stry 
where we are only interested in someth in g to the degree it 
ca n be expla i ned; thus 'u nde r s t anding ' is not crucial for 
Na tural Scientific endeavour. 
"In explanation, the phe~omena as they appear are 
trAnsformed in the sense that they are either 
subsumed unde r laws that relate them to other, 
different phenol,lena, or they are broken down into 
parts that somehow are taken as more real than 
the configuration of those parts that are taken to 
make up the phenomenon in question. Both senses 
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of explanation may be called reduction in that the 
phenomena no longer retain intactness, independence 
or inviolable wholeness." (Needleman, 1963, p. 39) 
We thus understand the explained phenomenon "o nly insofar 
as it is related, reduced, transformed into that which we 
have previously understood .... " (Needleman, 1963, p. 39 ) 
I n employing the phenomenological attitude of inquiry in 
Psychology, we open ourselves up to dimensions which may 
emerge as uniquely human. It is in the pursuance of this 
philosophical inquiry that we may find answers to the 
question: What should Psychology study? 
2.4 A Philosophical Basis for P~chol~~~~um~Science. 
The great contribution of Edmund Husserl to Psychology as a 
Human Scienc e is that he exposed the originality of the 
Lebenswelt (Life - World ) as the intelligible domain of human 
life. It will be shown how the 'Lebenswelt' directly arises 
out of an understanding of intentionality as the definitive 
characteristic of consciousness. A consideration of 
Existential - Phenomenology as an adequate philosophical 
foundation for Human Scientific Psychology will then be 
outlined. 
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2.4 . 1 'Intentionality' as the Dialectical Unity~ 
Consciousness and World. 
It was Husserl's predecessor, Brentano, who first noted the 
intentional nature of consciousness. Not having the 
phenomenological attitude of suspending judgement concern-
ing an external, objective world separate from its human 
constitution, Brentano distinguished between psychical 
phenomena and physical phenomena . He wished to know how 
the object of psychological empiricism differed from other 
objects of scientific experience. His answer was that 
psychological phenomena are characterised by ' intention -
al i ty', i.e . consciousness refers to something beyond 
itself which is not consciousness itself. 
"In the idea something is conceived, in the judge -
ment something is recognised or discovered, in 
loving loved, in hating hated, in desiring desired 
and so on . " 
(Brentano in Lawren c e &. 0' Connor, 1967, p. 334 ) 
Thus consciousness lS not a thing whi c h inhabits the body or 
world like other 'objects' but the very means which cast 
light on, and constitutes its objects , including the body. 
" The variation of a light pattern does not of 
itself point to, refer to, intend of itself 
something beyond itself--whereas an act of 
consciousness is essentially intentional, 
essentially refers beyond itself. " 
(Needleman, 1963, p. 44) 
Husserl's approach was more radical. Starting from the 
attitude of suspending all pre - conceptions regarding an 
objective world independent of our constitutive acts of 
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consciousness, he allowed 'what originally shows itself' 
to appear. In this attitude he noticed that what was, was 
phenomena appearing in consciousness o Affirming Brentano's 
discovery of 'intentionality' as the characteristic of 
co nsc iousness, he went further to undercut the very world-
view upon which the distinction between 'mental' and 
'p hysical' rests. Due to the nature of intentionality the 
so -called 'mental' and 'physica l ' cannot be separated as 
'things in thsffiselves'. They dialectically constitute one 
another a~d thus arise mutually, 
"One is no longer dealing with a material real i ty 
nor, moreover, with a mental reality, but with a 
significant who le or a structure which properly 
belongs neither to the external world nor to 
internal life. " 
(Merleau - Ponty in La Pointe, 1972, p. 250) 
This perspective must be c l ear l y distinguished from that 
of 'Idealism' on the one hand and ' Rea lism' on the other. 
It ·is not being said, as in the case of Idealism, that all 
we can ever really know is the content of our own ideas 
and the structure of our mi nds, This does not solve the 
prob l em of dualism as it leaves Man i so lated from the 
wcrld. Intentionality, however , acknowledges that the 
world may be really known, as consciousness reaches out 
into the wor l d. The 'realism' of natural-science, on the 
ot her hand, wishes to propose that the world may be known 
independ ent of the knower. I ntent i onality shows thst the 
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world 1S al way s 'for' man and cannot be viewed apar t from 
him. It is a world of sights seen, sounds heard, a nd things 
touched. Thus whatever the world is, it includes ourselves 
and it would be an untruth t o imagine otherwise. 
As this discussion is orientated towards a consideration of 
the study of Psychology, the more general quest of Husserlian 
Phenomenology , i.e. to find a philosophically rigorous 
foundation for knowledge, wi ll not be pursued. His 'pure 
phenomenology' claims to offer "insight into the genera l 
and necessary conditions required to make cogni s ance of 
obj ects existing de facto." (Husserl in Lawrence, 1967, 
p . 337). Suffice it to say that the phenomenological world-
view exposes the fallacy of viewing man as a self - contained 
object existing in a wor ld foreign to his constitution. 
It was with this duali stic assumption that the quest of 
trying to vicariously re-relate man back to h i s wor ld began. 
A phenomenological inquiry thus denies the starting -point 
of the Natural Scientific approach to Psychology; 
Man as an 'obj ect' is nowhere to be found. 
rather, 
2.4.2 The 'Lebenswelt ' as the Domain of Human Sc ientific 
Ps ycholog~. 
From the consideration of int e ntional ity , i t follows that 
Man's everyday experience in the context of its inter-
personal, embodied, historical matrix, becomes meaningful 
as being the irreducible and coherently int el ligible 'place ' 
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where we find man. This 'place' is however, a relationship, 
and thus not a thing but a dialogue. 
" When I naively reflect upon my experience of the 
world, as opposed merely to "having" such 
expe rience , I immediately d i scover that I live 
in a world which is peopled with things and with 
persons and that I am always in more or less 
intimate contact wit h the one or the other or 
both." (Kracklauer, 1972, p. 223) 
"the life-world is the world as we encounter it in 
everyday experience, the world in wh ich we pursue 
our goals and our objectives, the world as the 
scene of all our human activities." 
( Giorg i, 1970, p. 123) 
The ' Lebenswe lt ' has a horizonal character in that primary, 
everyday expe rie nce, shows things to be i nvariably appearing 
with i n the context of other things. It thus has a holistic 
i nte rn a l coherence by which anything happening can only be 
understood within its life-world context. 
Hence: 
" ••. a properly psychological question can be put to 
a phenomenon only when this phenomenon is descr ibed 
or understood in the mos t bas ic way possible, 
viz. in terms of the life-world." 
(Giorgi, 1970, p. 154) 
"Physics, biOlogy, geography, send us back to every-
day exper ie nce to understand what rivers are, what 
green i s and what it means to see." 
(La Pointe, 1972, p. 253) 
Contrary to the Natural Scientific claim that it is concerned 
with 'objective reality' We find that what it deals with 
are abstractions from reality and that the life-world is 
the ground for sc ientif ic reflection. Natural Sc ienc es 's 
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approach to Psychology, however, has been to turn this on 
its head. From the abstractions of Euclidian Geometry 
Natural Sc i ence arr i ves at the concepts of space, time and 
causality as quantified, and then applies this back to 
experience as though the former conta i ned the latter i nstead 
of the other way around . In th i s way Natural Science 
completes a self-fulfilling circle, which once . made, 
constitutes a jump by which we are barred from approaching 
orig i nal experience as it is lived. This i s not a critic i sm 
of Natural Science in i tself as, by necessity, sc i ent i f ic 
reflection depends on an abstraction from the l ife - world. 
Rather, it i s to make explicit the ph ilosophical foundations 
of Natura l Sc i ence and thus remind us of the problems 
inherent i n viewing Natural Sci ence as an absolute approach 
to reality. More spec i f ically , such c ons i derat i on wi ll warn 
us of accept in g a Natura l Scientific world - view as 
unquestionably appl ied to Psychology. 
It i s hoped that the Lebenswe lt has now been exposed as the 
characteristic qua lity of lif e as human ly lived. 
"Th e world in which we exist cannot be reduced to the 
objectiv e variables and functional relationships 
which physical sc i ence reveals. The life-world has 
a mean i ngful structure of its own, which must be 
approached in a very d i fferent way if it is not to 
be radically reduced and distorted. " 
(La Pointe, 1972, p. 245) 
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The vision of Man revea l ed by 'intentionality' and the 
'Lebenswelt' has been the fo c us area of Existential-
Phenomenology. Marti n He i degger's ontology will be 
presented as a coherent description of the basic dimensions 
of human ex i stenc8 0 It will be shown that su ch a view of 
Man i s not conclu s ive regarding psychological questions, 
but rather point s to the area of study, the premise being 
that if we are · to s tudy Man we must at least know what he 
is and where to f ind him. 
2.4.3 An Existential-Phenomenological View of Ma n. 
Heidegger focuse s on the ontological que st ion: 'How does 
being appear ' and in so doing, pursues a phenomenological 
line of inquiry which does not e ven begin with the a pr i ori 
existence of consciousness. It is no ted that Husserl's 
phenomenology does not adequately expose Man as presence 
to the world as rad ically a s He i degger ' s because of 
Husserl ' s concern of exposing transcendental con s ciousne ss 
as the foundation of knowledge. 
"It is man who gives the various beings their sense 
of being and not an i mpersonal tran scendental 
consciousness." (Strasser, 1967, p. 350) 
He i degger shows us that, "the tota li ty of be ing ( Se inde) 
is always showing itself (to man) i n some or other of its 
manifold forms or part icularities e.g. plant, animals, 
r ivers, buildings, other people, etc. " (Kruger, 1977, 
p. 9). Man i s thus constituted in such a way that his 
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essence may be described as an original presence to the world: 
Man is the be·ing by which being comes to light. 
Heidegger expresses this original relatedne ss of Man and 
the world in the term 'Oa se i n ' wh ich has been rough ly trans-
l ated as Being-i n- the-world. In this relationship Man is 
not an isolated ' self' which relates it se lf to an outside 
wo rld, but i s already 'out there' in the world, and the 
world shows i tself according to his possible modes of be ing. 
Man may be seen as ek-sistence in the sense of 'stan d ing 
out' toward things and participating in bringing them to 
light in various ways. 
"Part of the definition of oase i n or human being i s 
that i t i s already-in - the - world : Dase i n does not 
emerge as Dasein unless it has already constituted 
it s world . " (Needleman, 1963, p. 17) 
Man and the world thus form a cohesive unity; one cannot 
be strictly described without the other . It is cl ear that 
this view of an embodies both the concept of i ntentionality 
and the 'Leben swelt '. It more clearly describes the relation -
sh ip between Man and the 'Lebe nswelt ' a nd in so doing offers 
a philosophical basis for the study of Psychology as a 
Human Science .. 
From Heidegg e r's description of Oase in as Be ing-in-t he - world , 
it follows that we can not describe an without describing 
the world as clarified by him. To attempt to describe Man 
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without this, is to att empt t o describe a void: there is 
nothing to be found. Heidegger's phenomenological analysis 
of Dase in is thus not an analysis of the human subject but 
of the possibl~ modes of Being-in-the - world. 
The world shows itself to man as the dimensions and 
relationships by which he lives. In this original sense , 
space is not a quant i fied extens i on but rather the qua li-
tative spat iali sing of Being-i n- the - world as a characteristic 
d i mens i on of the' Lebenswelt' : 
"The generelly accepted view of space is that of 
Descartes, according to which space is simply 
extension and there i s no qual ita tive difference 
between various plac e s o r po int s i n space. 
I n other words , everything i s made fully equal 
wi th i n this space •••• However, this geometr ic 
concept i on of space i s not the spatialisation 
in which man lives. Our nearness or farness to 
other human beings, our feel i ngs of warmth , 
closeness and intimacy is not measured by thi s 
sort of physical d i stance. ... From a human 
perspective the world i s not in limitless space, 
our space is i n the world. !! 
(Kruger, 1977, p. 22) 
Thus Man ' s existence i s spatial i sed in ways that are 
qualitatively exper i enced in our everyday lives. Si milarly , 
Man's relationship to time , his body , fellowman, and a 
l i fe - project all mutually in teract to define his existence. 
Man as constitutive and revealing act may be truthfully 
stud i ed by describing hi$ everyday exper i ence as lived in 
the various relationships of being-i n-t he - world. 
Such de scrip t ion s will have a holistic cohesion which will 
i ntel ligib ly inform us of Man in his irr educ i ble relatedness. 
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For Psychology it emerges, as Mer l eau - Ponty noted, that 
behaviour i s neither a thing nor an idea. Behav io ur takes 
plac e with i n a context of mean i ng wh ic h i s given 
intelligibility by a man's holisti c Being-i n-t he - wor l d. 
Human action can only be partially understood without 
reference to th i s greater context. The human body is not 
in space and time but of space and time: it is the situated 
c ontext of being-in-the-world and is mea ni ng - g iving by its 
very constitution. Its place in the c ontext of Being-in-
the-world is the substan tial bringing to light of things. 
'Hardness' arises out of the knocking of hand on table; 
'hardness' is neither projected onto the table by 'the mind' 
nor in the table itself--the meaning comes into being i n the 
interaction of body and world. Man also relates himself to 
the past and future t hrough the meaning it has for the 
overal l context of Be in g-in-the-world. The dep re ssed mode 
is a world in which the future appears as i nac c essible 
amongst other things. 
inaccessible future: 
Depress i on does not cause an 
they can not be viewed a s separate 
phenomena; rather, depression i s a context in which the 
relationship to the future emerges in this way. We do not 
understand depress i on by looking at a man 's brain but through 
an understanding of his Being-in-the-w orld as the context 
of his life. If I have laboured the point, it is be cau se 
of the elus ive ness of the obvi ous whi ch has taken Psychology 
down paths of philosophical vagueness in its attempts to 
localise Man. If nothing else, it is hoped that what has 
been shown i s that Man cannot be localised as apart from 
his wor l d and therefo r e should not be approached as such. 
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2.5 Pr inciples for Ps yc ho logy conceived as a Human Science. 
Existential Phe no meno l ogy has obv i ous implications for 
Psy chol ogy i n that it has elucidated both a philosoph ical 
view of Man and a methodological att itu de for our approach 
to phenomena. This section concretely ou tlines the issue s 
t hat Existential- Phe nomenology may addre ss. 
"when one is interested in studying man at his 
highest level of func tion ing, at the level o f 
u neq uiv o cally human, then facts o btaine d at a 
lower leve l of fu nctioning are not nec e ssarily 
re leva nt a s s uc h. " (G iorgi, 1970, p . 1 68 ) 
In going 'back to the thing itself' we find Ma n as Be ing-
in-the-wor l d ; of 'being s ha ped and giving shape' 
( Von Eckartsberg i n Gio rgi etal , 1971, p. 67). It f o llows 
that psychological questions mu s t address them se lves to the 
'Lebenswel t' • Thi s i s the c o nt e xt in which Man lives. 
In thi s perspective experience as it is lived be c omes the 
irr e d uc i b l e phenomenon of study in i ts own right. 
"t he task that confronts a phenomenolog ic a l 
psychology i s t he work of reveali ng and 
mak i ng explicit the u nw ri tten co nstitut i on 
of everyday life." 
(Strauss in Fi s c he r, 197 .1, p. 405) 
Here the i mpo rt an c e of 'u njerstand i ng ' rather tha n 
Thus : 
'ex p lana t i o~' be~ome s i mportant . Ex peri ence i s not vie~ed 
as an epiphenomenon to be explained i n terms of some t h i ng 
else s uch as bra in st ate or behavioural d i sposit ion. 
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Rather, its intelligibility is approached within the context 
of the Lebenswelt. In our theorising we will not impose 
constructs on the phenomenon which may displace it, but will 
rather employ a method which will allow it to emerge as much 
as possible in its contextual givenness . 
"The comprehensive psychologist will bu ild his 
theory on anthropological constructs to be 
sure , but the constructs themselves should 
never be rooted in theory but in the firm 
ground of actual experience ." 
(Van Kaam, 1969, p. 232) 
If questionnaires are to be used in psychological research, 
the quest io ns a sked must not be phrased in terms of the 
constructs of the psychologist but must have arisen from 
the perspective of the persons studied. Rigorous pheno -
menological research wou l d be open - ended in facil i tating the 
phenomenon to emerge in terms of the perspectives and 
importance of the people concerned and thus avoid standard -
ised questions to which the experience must be fitted. 
I n our quest of understanding Man's liv ed experience, the 
importance of meaning r a ther than measurement emerges as a 
focus of concern. 
"I f beh a viour partakes of intentional relations, 
and if the route to understanding intentionality 
comes through the phenomenon of meaning, then it 
is clear that the relev a nt question for under -
standing behaviour is to inquire about its 
meaning --not its measurement .'! 
(Giorgi, 1970, p. 1 61 ) 
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It has been noted that the spatiality, temporality and body 
of the Lebenswelt are not the space, time and body of natural 
physics. In Psychology as a Human Sc ie nce , we are i nterested 
in the quality of human existence in the meaningful c ontext 
of t h e 'Lebenswelt' rather than the reductio n of human 
phenomena to the quantified world, of natural science . 
Thus 'faithful description' emerges as the method of choice. 
Such descr iption will faithfully reflect the phenomena of 
human existence in their holistic context. 
Given the quest for faithful description, we will acknowledge 
the historical and unique context of Man's lived - world by 
not insist ing on identical repetition as the criterion of 
validity i n our research, but rather that it s essent ial theme 
be identified through its varying man ife stations . 
This essential theme is describe d in such a way that it may 
be intersubject ively understood. Given the nature of our 
shared-wor ld, we can expect to have s imilar experiences, 
e.g. anger, joy, etc. We cannot, however, expect the con -
text of these experiences to be identical in every ca se 
( or even in more than one case). 
The meaningful context of the ' Lebenswelt ' also exposes the 
fallacy of viewing behaviour as a determined reaction to 
environmental conditions. We have noted how the world of 
meaning is constituted by Man ' s clarifying presence and thus 
not a world acting on man or vice versa. We see th at Man 
c onst itutes a future and a past with goals, expectations, 
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a nd regrets and that he makes choices regarding his actions 
with i n th is context of relationships. We thus must view 
h i m as an i ntention a l subj ec t who acts wit hin su ch cont e xt. 
We . cannot just view h i s behaviour from the outs ide though as 
it was not a function o f meaning but a s a result of 
environmental cau ses i nde pende nt of h i s c onst i tut i ve ac ts. 
We must enqu i re in to the meaning acts have for h i m a s a 
huma n subject ra ther than i nfer ri ng su c h me ani ng or 
experience from a preconceived theoret ical or ientat i on . 
This leads us on to the nature of psychological research 
itself. 
The Natu ra l Sc ientific approach to Psy chology has a lw a ys 
stressed th e i mport a nce of the researcher being t he 
'independent observer ' in order t o achieve ' objectiv e ' 
results . In herent in this perspective are far-reaching 
ass u mpt i ons concerning the nature of object i v i ty, the 
n a ture of an experiment a nd the nature of man . 
The term ' objective ' has c ome to me a n , in Natural Sci ence, 
the i ndependence of the observer and the observed . 
I n this way it was thought that the nature of the object 
c ou ld be observed 'in i tsel f' . When this approach was 
applied to Man, it was assu med that he too c ould be stud i ed 
a s a 'thing i n it se lf ' as apart from the researcher . 
Here it was a ssumed as i n the case of Natura l Scientifi c 
objects that the " obser ved c onstitu ted a world indepe nden t 
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of the observer." (Romanyshyn, 1971, p. 95). However, 
we have seen in our consideration of the nature of Man, 
that he i s not an 'object' but a part i cipant in a world of 
meaning shared by the researcher himself. Thus the researcher 
is part of that which he is studying; the investigator is 
also the investigated . Eoelen (1968), has noted that to be 
'objective' in the sense of looking at things as they really 
are, we must acknowledge the intersubjective nature of man 
in our research. We thus acknowledge the presence of the 
researcher in psycholog i cal research and the fact that what 
emerges In the research situation is a function of the 
interpersonal dialogue which may be explicitly described. 
"Any research situation in Psychology is always a 
place where the engaged projects of two different 
attitudes intersect, even if it is only one 
subject responding to a stimulus. " 
(Giorgi, 1970, p. 190) 
"The human way in which the researcher is de facto 
present can be described both by himself and by 
the subjects, and the meanings that emerge from 
these descript i ons represent the control, or set 
the limits for understanding other data that may 
have been obta i ned." 
(Giorgi, 1970, p. 131) 
The idea of 'obje c tive exper i mentation' also carries wi th 
it the assumption that the results obtained from exper i-
mentation arise from the nature of the phenomenon as 'thing 
in itself'. However, because of the contextuality of the 
Lebenswelt, the nature of the phenomenon will be a function 
of the context in which it appears and thus be d i storted 
from its everyday lived - context . We should thus acknowledge 
49 
that the experimental context changes a phenomenon to be 
described a nd explicat e the meaning o f the s it uat ion as 
part of the methodo l ogical procedure. Because of the 
uniqueness and historical nature of human existence, both 
resea rc her and rese ar ched are being changed by the rese a rch 
metho d and the phenomena to be researched must thus 
reflect th i s mo v ement. This is not to say that the 
essent i al structures of the phenomenon may not be elicited, 
but rather that acknowledgement of psychologica l phenomena 
in terms of their qualitative flow a nd h i storica l context 
must be reflected in a c omp r ehens i ve descript i on . 
Psy c hology as a Human Science cann ot propose a methodo logy 
as though i t was independent of the phenomenon to be 
i nvestigated. We can not redu c e a phenomenon so that i t 
may fit into a pre -e xist in g method. The primac y of meth od 
i n the Natural Sc i entif i c approach to Psychology has led 
to so - cal l ed ' operational definitions' in wh ic h the 
phenomenon i s def ined i n terms of the experimental para -
meters. It must be remembered that methodology is concerned 
wit h ex pos ing the na ture of the phenomenon and not reduc i ng 
it to someth i ng elae ( i. e . in terms of methodolog ica l 
procedure ) where it will be mi ssed. 
" I t i s phenomenologically unsound to establ i sh a 
method that must be used th a t i s pr i or to and 
i ndependent of the phenomenon to be i nvest i gated . 
The problems of methodo l ogy cannot be considered 
in isolation, but only within the conte x t of the 
phenomenon to be investigated and the problem 
aspect of that phenomenon. " 
(Gi o rgi, 1971 , p. ll ) 
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Thus methodology in Human Scientif ic Psychology will be 
concerned wi th the rigorous way in which a phenomenon i s 
described while remaining faithful to its context in the 
' Lebenswelt '. The rig our of the method must be made 
publ i cly explic i t so that the research may be carried out 
step by step by another r esearcher . The validity of the 
research will not depend on replicabili ty of results but 
rather on whether the research has led to a deeper inter-
subjective understanding of the phenomenon concerned i n both 
its unique and shared aspects . There are thus different 
possible methods i n the phenomenological enterpr i se which 
are to be ev alua ted ac c ord in g to the a bove princ iple s . 
A criticism of specif ic methods, however, do not c onstitute 
a criticism of the Existen tial-Phenomenolog i cal approach to 
Psychology. Much development in concrete methodology is 
needed . Methods of postural observat i on, more soph i s -
t icated methods of el i cit i ng meaning i n i ts full context -
uality, and refinement of articulated description of 
essential structures all need to be developed and i mpDoved 
upon . The Existential-Phenomenological view of Man is 
offered as a comprehensive framework within which such 
development can take place. Its relevance lies in the 
fact that it can show us how man lives h i s life and thus 
lead to an increased understand i ng of ourselves. 
Its valid i ty as a view of man cannot be quest i oned i n terms 
of rightness or wrongness but in terms of comprehensiveness. 
In such an enqu i ry it ph ilosophically emerges as the most 
primary and irreducible level of understand i ng Man i n his 
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relatedness. It is possible to suspend t his relatedness 
for utilitar i an purposes (as in the case of behavioural a nd 
physiological studies) but Man as Man must always emerge if 
a comprehensive understanding is to be achieved. 
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3 Method 
3.1 Goal and Ap pr oa ch of St~. 
In the theoret ical sect i on, I outl in ed the i mport a nt role 
that an awareness of human finitude may have for our lives. 
Follow i ng on from su ch theorising , a n emp i r ica l study 
suggested itself. Su c h a study has a s i ts general goal the 
underst a nd i ng and des crip tion of the ex perience of confront-
i ng human finitude through a consideration of de a th. 
Th i s broad goa l may be seen as c onform i ng to a phenomeno-
log ical a pproac h which does not wish to begin with a 
preconce iv ed hypothesis and thus reduce the phenomenon from 
ti:1e start ; but rather wi shes to describe the emergent 
phenomenon as well as i ts research context within which it 
i s to be v i ewed. Thus, although the researcher has pre-
conceptions ab out the experience of confronting one ' s 
finitude, such quest ions will be put to the data on ly after 
a f u ll description by the subject s has been e x pl ica ted . 
Based on this description, any qu estions of the dat a may 
then be asked--not only by the researcher concerned but by 
others who may ha ve different questions. Thus phenomeno -
log ica l descr ip t i on necessarily suggests more research, but 
research which i s based on the phenomenon as fully described 
rather than it s theory or e xp lanation. 
"It i s axiomatic that a l l good research generat es 
more resear c h. It should be obv i ous that this 
i s true of qualitative research as well. More 
questions are raised by the research than ar e 
answered." (Giorgi, 1975, p. 971 
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Phenomenologi c al Psychology has as its quest the inter-
subjective understanding of human experience and action i n 
i ts holistic, conte x tual givenness. Any research must thus 
lead to an increased personal and interpersonal understand -
i ng of the phenomenon studied. Here is the re l evance of 
its approach as well as its validity: relevance, in that 
it allows a growth i n the understand i ng of the relatedness 
of human existence by striving for coherence; validity, 
in that it calls for the comment of all people who have 
shared the e x perience studied. 
I n a d i alogue of the phenomenological approach and general 
goal of this study with the method, it becomes clear that 
the method to be used must have as its concern the release 
of data according to the subjects' perspective and 
intentional meanings. Method in Phenomenological Psychology 
cannot be rigidly standardised i n its specific details, 
but must, according to its pr i nciple, be appropriate to 
the phenomenon it is attempting to describe. Thus, in 
agreement wi th Gi org i (1975), the method to be used 
... "is ne i ther exclusive nor exhaustive and it should not 
be considered paradigmatic for all phenomenologically based 
resea rc h " (Giorgi, 1 975 , p. 83). The method to be described 
emerged from a concern to revea l the ex perience of confront-
ing human finitude i n its co ntextual g iv enness as closely 
as possible. Such methodo l ogy, although applicable primarily 
to this particular study, nevertheless follows rigorous 
procedural steps wh ic h will be explicitly described. 
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Any researcher wishing to replicate the study may thus do so. 
The specific steps to be followed constitute specificall y 
applicable procedures which are examples of general 
principles in phenomenological research . Such general 
principles embody procedures which allow the reve la tion 
of an essential description of the phenomenon studied 
without distorting the essential meaning of the original 
data. It does not thus employ i ntrapsychic structures or 
any terms not relevant to the subjects' experience 
(e.g. stimulus/response) . Rather, it requires a description 
which directly reveals the subjects' experience as 
experience, and to this end, uses i ntentional language. 
This leads us on to another princ i ple which governs the 
approach of phenomenolog ica l research: the relationship 
between un iq ueness and essentiality in human experience. 
"It i s absolutely with i n the nature of human 
ex i stence that no two subjects can ever be 
completely the same. No two situations can 
ever be completely the same for anyone 
subject , however much we may be able to 
dupl icat e the phys ical fac ilities . ... 
However, by asking the same question of 
different people, or to the same person at 
different t i mes, we can see common themes 
emerge." 
(Kruger , 1977, p. 15) 
If one lS thus to remain true to the existential realities 
of living, psychological research must be able to elucidate 
human existence i n both its unique and shared contexts. 
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If Psychology had no means by which to move beyond the 
un1que characteristics of experience and action, it would 
become a sterile enterprise . On the other hand, if it 
ignored the unique life-history and projects of people, it 
would by-pass important insights , qualifications and 
rationale to the data collected. 
It 1S with this understanding that the present study attempts 
to arrive at a descriptio n of the essential or invariant 
meanlngs of the experien c e of confronting human finitude 
whilst maintaining a sense of uniqueness 1n the flow of 
individual life . The phenomenological procedure will thus 
not only arrive at an essential description, but yield 
observations concerning the context of the phenomenon 
studied in individual cases. Such observations will be 
pursued 1n the 'discussion' section and will reveal the 
confrontation of human finitude within the unique historical 
context of the person as well as within the context of the 
research situation. 
The approach of this research thus conforms to the following 
characteristics of Phenomenological Psych o logy: 
1. The concern to describe the phenomenon in such a way that 
it remains true to the meaning and experience of the 
subjects studied in irreducible, 'lived-world' terms . 
2. The concern to devise a method that is not primary, but 
is appropriate to the revelation of an adequate 
description of the phenomenon studied. 
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3. The concern to expose the essential or i nvar ia nt structure 
of the phenomenon whilst mainta i n i ng a sense of the un ique 
h i stor ical flow of personal life. 
3.2 Ration a le for Experiential Procedures . 
I n reviewing previous psychological research wi th a pheno -
menological orientation, a d i fficulty in gett i ng to the 
experience -a s-it-i s - lived in contrast to a rem i n isc ent 
refle c t i on of a past experien ce Was noticed. For example, 
i n a study i nto the experience of anger, Stevick ( 1 971), 
gave her subjects the following i nstruction : " Try to 
remember the last time you were a ngry a nd tell me an yth i ng 
you can about the s i tuation , about what you felt , did , or 
said. " (Stev i ck, 1971, p. 135 ). It was through the 
reflect i ons of the subject s i n a non -a ngry s i tu ation that 
Stev ic k attempted to arrive at the lived - experience of anger. 
Although th i s method did yield an insightful desc ri pt i on of 
anger, it i s not as adequate as a more immediate description 
of the subjects ' thoughts, feelings and s it uat i on while 
be i ng angry. This requirement would raise many problems 
for phenomenological methodology but would constitute the 
most rigorous app roach to studying the 'phenomenon i tself' . 
I t was with th i s concern in mind that I wished to get 
beyond a mere descr i pt i on of the subjects ' reflections on 
de a th in a c ontext where they may be distanced from the 
requ i red experience of confronting hum a n finitude through a 
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consideration of death. Such reflections on death would be 
more authentic if they arose out of con c rete situations in 
which the subjects may consider the i r life in the face of 
death. A confrontation with human finitude was thus made 
available through a series of procedures which presented the 
opportunity for subjects to consider their life in the face 
of their death in an interpersonal , temporal and bodily 
context. In this way it was felt that the subjects may come 
closer to an experience of confronting their f i nitude than 
by reflection alone . The emergent e xpe rience as described 
by the subjects are thus a function of the procedures and 
must be seen within this c onte x t. Whether thesB procedures 
allow the subjects to approximate an experience of confront-
ing their finitude more than reflection on the meaning of 
death alone will be evaluated in the 'd iscussion ' section. 
It must be noted that the procedures did not have as their 
prima r y goal to change the subjects ' perspectives towards 
life or death . I f su c h change takes place as a result of a 
confrontation with human finitude , it must be remembered 
that all relational situations in life, including research 
situations, happen within a historical context . 
" Both the person researched as well as the 
research - person are thus being changed 
through the e x istential research method --
they ch a nge each other." 
(Von Eckartsberg , in Giorgi et al , 1971 , - 76 ) 
Two things may thus be happening In this particular research 
situation : 
1. The experience of confront i ng one's finitude. 
2. Change of the person, however slight, in confronting 
one's finitude. 
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The present research focuses on the former; a consideration 
of the latter may be interesting but is beyond the scope of 
this study although such possibilities will be reviewed 
when considering ind i vidual variations in the 'discussion' 
section. 
The procedures may be seen as the situation within which the 
experience of confronting human finitude emerges as the 
phenomenon to be studied. Other situations in wh i ch the 
experience may emerge wi ll be d i scussed in a later section. 
The procedures were suggested by an understand i ng of the 
intentional nature of experience as well as by the 
insp i ration of an article by James F.T. Bugental (1973) 
entitled "Confronting the Existential Meaning of ' my Death' 
thro~ Group Exercises." 
Bugental used four procedures which aided participants i n 
a group s i tuation to "confront meaningfully the concept, 
'my death'." (Bugental, 1973, p. 148). These procedures 
were described under the headings: (1) drawing a life l i ne; 
(2) confronting cont i ngency; (3) the Orpheus experience, 
and (4) writing obituaries. For a full description of these 
procedures, the reader is referred to the original article. 
Procedures (2) and (4) were adapted to the requirements of 
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the present research (see procedures F and H) . Whereas 
Bugental was verbally explicit in the kind of insights to 
be facilitated through the procedures, I " wished to verbally 
structure each procedure as l i ttle as possible. For example, 
in the 'Contingency Encounter', Bugental expresses the 
following as part of his instructions: 
"Now we want to try to explore one aspect of this 
relentless f"act of "my death" in the hope that we 
may ga i n a more authentic and vital sense of our 
l i ves. The aspect on which we will focus is the 
fact that we cannot know when death will come 
upon us. " 
(Bugental, 1973, p. 153) 
I t was felt that procedures (1) and (3) requ ir ed too much 
explicit direction from the group leader and would thus be 
inappropriate to th i s particular research, where the subjects' 
own words in describ i ng his/her experience is important. 
The basic ingredient of the 'Contingency Encounter', that 
is, to randomly select a subject's name who, on being called, 
must immediat~ly stop what he/she is doing, was used i n this 
research (Procedure F) and adapted to suit a less time -
consuming context, ( i. e. during a per i od of singing rather 
than over the period of the entire programme). 
The basic idea of 'Writing Obituaries' was to write about 
'myself' from another's point of view after ' I ' have died. 
This idea was adapted for this research (Procedure H), but 
within a more informal context of writing a letter from a 
close friend's point of view to a mutual friend of the 
deceased. 
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The procedures which were not used in the present research 
((1) drawing a life line; (2) the Orpheus experience), 
constituted guided meditations which focused on the temporal 
flow of one's l i fe as a totality and a consideration of the 
importance of one's various i dentities and roles. These 
procedures were not used because of their highly structured 
directions. 
The present research wished to fac ilitate the opportun it y 
for subjects to confront the meaning of death in terms of 
its i ntentional context of interpersonal, bodily and 
temporal relationships. Arising out of the Existential -
Phenomenolog ical insight of exper i ence being intentional, 
I felt that if an authentic exper i ence is to be facilitated, 
then it would arise out of these intentional contexts. 
3.3 The Subjects. 
Six subjects (two females and four males) were chosen 
according to the fulfillment of certain conditions for 
experiential research as outlined by Van Kaam (1969): 
(a) the ability to express themselves with relative ease 
in the English language; 
(b) the ability to sense and to express inner feelings and 
emotions without shame and inhibition; 
(c) the ability to sense and to express the organic 
experie nces that accompany these feelings ; 
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( d ) a spontaneous interest in his experience on the part 
of the subject. 
Added to these conditions was the criter i on that the subjects 
express interest in enquiring i nto the dimens i ons of their 
own ex i stence and a commitment to self - understand i ng. 
They were thus not ' naive' subjects and all admitted that 
they had reflected on the nature of death in the past. 
The concern is to clarify the phenomenon of confronting one's 
own f i nitude and su c h past reflecting by the subjects may 
assist the task of the procedures to bring such experience 
more into focus. It will be shown that the des i gn of the 
procedures were such as to expose the relationship between 
reflections based on actual lived experience and reflections 
which may be said to hav e been adopted from secondary sources 
that have not been fully integrated into the subjects' 
world e.g. books or the i deals of others. Should such 
ambivalence occur, it would i n i tself clarify the nature 
of the phenomenon. 
I t is a limitat i on of the present stage of phenomeno l ogical 
research that we cannot use as subjects those who cannot 
adequately art ic ulate the i r experience. Thus, it remains a 
c hallenge for Phenomenological Psychology to move beyond 
the astute descript i ons of the lived-world by such articulate 
writers as Sartre , Merleau - Ponty, Strasser, etc. 
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The six subjects were unmarried post - graduate university 
students of the Arts and Human Sc ie nces between the ages of 
21 and 26 years and were evaluated as adequate in terms of 
the aforementioned criteria. Further , they all expressed 
a trust in the researcher which contributed to the 
establishment of a rapport between researcher and researched 
which i s so necessary for the phenomenological enterprise. 
The number of sub jects was considered suff i c i ent for the 
present nomothetic phenomenological study to demonstrate 
essentiality as wel l as un iqueness . The concern i s not, 
as in the Natural Scientific appr oach , to achieve a 
representative sample of the population. Rather, i t is to 
explicate an essential descr iption of the experience of 
confronting one ' s f init ude within the unique flow of one ' s 
l i fe ; and thus qualitative experience rather than quanti-
t ativ e enumeration i s emphas i sed. We are concerned not with 
the quest i on of who or how many peop le achieved such an 
exper i ence, but rather wi th the descr i pt i on of the 
experience in it s qualitative dimensions. An idiographic 
study may have achieved such description but would not have 
shown the un iq ue contexts wh ic h highl i ght and define the 
experience as essent ial and shared. 
3.4 Descr iEtio n of the Resear ch Sit uat i on . 
On asking the s i x subjects to participate in the research, 
I said that the research would i nvolve them participating in 
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certain procedures which were designed to glve them an 
opportunity to confront the meaning of death and that they 
would be asked to articulate their experience. We met on 
a pre - arranged date in a room within which we were unlikely 
to be disturbed . 
On arriving I told the subjects that I was interested in 
enquiring into the meaning of death and that they were to 
participate in such enquiry. I told them that certain 
procedures had been designed to assist in such enquiry and 
that such enquiry may , therefore, expose them to possible 
change in their orientation towards life and death. 
I asked them whether they were willing to enter into this 
enqulry pro ce ss , to which they agreed. They were als o 
asked to respond to the procedures in terms of their 
immediate thoughts and experiences . This was asked in order 
to ensure response in terms of immediate lived experience. 
The subjects were issued with paper and pens and were 
asked to beg i n by reflecting on , and writing , a short 
essay (about one page) entitled: ' What my own death means 
to me', followed by a comma, and their own name, in order 
to bring home the impact of the situation . This procedure 
was de signed to elicit their immediate reflections and 
pre - conceptions in order to evaluate the mann er in which 
the essential des c ription of confronting one ' s own finitude 
related to such initial reflections. The subjects were 
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asked not to communicate their responses in any way to one 
another, so that unique responses relating to each particular 
subject could be facilitated. 
In the first procedure , the subjects were paired off and 
asked to sit directly opposite their partner, knees almost 
touching . They were asked to hold their partner ' s hands 
and look directly at each other . One of the partners in 
each case was instructed in the fOllowing way : " When you 
feel ready and able, address your partner by his/her name , 
followed by the words 'I see you as dying'." Thus, in 
this situat i on one partner is attempting to constitute the 
other ' as dying' in whatever way he/she is able and he/she 
communicates this to his/her partner . The procedure took 
varying periods in each of the three ca ses (1 - 3 minutes). 
The subjects were asked to write down their experience of 
the procedure immediately after they had completed the 
procedure . Thus three subjects wrote down t h e experience 
of being told that they were being seen 'a s dying', and 
three subjects wrote down the experience of having to 
constitute and tell the other that he was being seen 'as 
dying'. The situations were then reversed so that those 
who had previously been constituted 'as dying ' by their 
partner were now the ones to constitute the other ' as dying'. 
We thus emerge with a description by each person of both 
experiences . I t is to be noted that this procedure, by 
its nature, emphasises the meaning of death in an i nter -
personal context in which the eradication of death - denial 
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between people is facilitated . Whether such opportunity is 
realised remains to be seen i n a consideration of the results. 
He re, then, an experience of confronting death rather than a 
denial of death is facilitated as is the aim of the research . 
In asking the subje c ts to write down their experiences 
immediately , acc ess to their immediate lived - experience of 
the situat i on was achieved . Written protocols have been 
criticised (5ardello in Giorgi et al , 1971) as being 
removed from the lived - experience of a verbal researched -
researcher dialogue , but it is felt that , in this particular 
research, the immediacy of the written protocol mitigates 
such criticism . Such written protocols may also be more 
certainly described as the subject's own experience in his 
own terms without any possible interference in expression . 
To this end, it was made clea r in the beginning that the 
subjects were not to share their experiences with anyone 
else until the research situation had been fulfilled . 
The protocols were thus obtained by means of the self -
report method as outlined by Von Eckartsberg (1971). 
" I n self report , the person studied gives an account 
of his activities and e xperiences in the situations 
either verbally or in writing . In either case we 
obtain a protocol focused on the experience of a 
situation. The focus on a situation gives us a 
meaningful and comprehensive unit to work with." 
(Von Eckartsberg in Giorgi et al , 1971 , p . 76) 
The previous procedure was then repeated, but this time with 
the instructions: "When you fe~l ready and able, address 
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your partner by his/her name, followed by the words, 'I 
see you as living r ." Each subje c t was on the receiving end 
as well as the g i v i ng end of the above commun ica t i on. 
As before , i n each case the subject s wrote down the ir 
exper i ence of the procedure immediately afterwards . 
Th i s procedure wa s des i gned to prov i de the opportun i ty for 
subjects to experience a relat i onsh ip, if any, betwee n be in g 
confronted wi th the constitution of oneself and fellowman 
'as dying ' and the constitution of oneself and fe llowman 
'as l i v i ng '. 
I n the next procedure , the subject s were g i ven the follow i ng 
instructions: " Think about a song or songs which ma y depict 
or symbol i se i n any way your everyday living and i nter -
acting. This song may be e i ther made up as you go along or 
it may be already known to you . When I say "beg i n ", walk 
around, stopp i ng to s i ng your own personal song to another 
or stopping to l i sten to a nother ' s a nd thus i nter a ct with 
the sing i ng and mov i ng . Make of th i s whatever you will. 
I will st an d on th i s c ha i r i n the corner representing death. 
At random i nterva l s I will cal lout someone 's name. 
That person i s called to de ath. On be i ng c alled, you are 
to i mmed i ately leave whatever you are doing and walk to. the 
nearest corner where you will stay wi th your back to the 
liv i ng unt il the end of the procedure . 
questions? Ready? Begin. " 
Are there any 
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After everyone had been called at random i nterva l s (f i ve 
seconds to three mi nutes ) in a formal way , stat i ng the i r 
fu l l names, the subjects were asked to s i t down and, wi thout 
talk i ng to anybody, to wr i te down the i r exper ie nce of that 
s it uat ion. I t will be noticed that this procedure emphas i ses 
an in teract i onal context for the mean i ng of de a th . 
Th~ .unknownness of time of de a th as well as i ts certainty i s 
suggested by this procedure . This i s in keeping with the 
a ttem pt to present death a s an ex i stentia l reality i n our 
lives. I t will also be noticed that ' De a th ' as being 
represented by me was present dur i ng the ent ir e pr o c edure . 
The subjects were give n an opportun ity through th i s procedure 
to reflect on (1) the death of another whom they are inter-
acting wit h when he or she i s called, (2) the i mminence of 
h i s or her own death , (3) the experience of actually being 
called and having to constitute onese l f towards one ' s death. 
These th i ngs were not expl icitly suggested to the subjects 
but may be seen to be implicit i n both the procedure and in 
the ex i stential reality of death. 
The next procedure simulated the physical situation of death 
and dy i ng. Subjects were given the follow i ng i nstruct i ons: 
" For the next f iv e mi nutes or so I would like you all to 
th i nk about the postural movements of your own body in dy i ng 
and death. Do not communicate your reflections to anybody. 
When you are ready, each of you will in turn physically 
dramatise and attempt to be exper i entially open to your dying 
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posture or movements . Are there any quest i ons? Spend five 
mi nutes reflecting on your dying postu r e. " After approx i-
mately five minutes, subjects expressed their readiness to 
dramatise their dy i ng posture. Each d i d so in turn wh ile 
the rest looked on. The subjects were then asked to describe 
i n wr i ting what they had done and how they experienced this 
procedure. I t will be noted that th i s procedure projects 
the subjects to the moments before t heir death and the 
phys i cal dramat i sat i on of this. This ~ s in keep i ng wi th tffi 
attempt to fac i litate a confrontat i on wi th death in a 
personal context wh i ch stresses i ts 'ownness'. This is 
im plicit i n the structure of one's own death but was not 
s ugges ted explic i tly to the subjects concerned. 
The final procedure suggested a cons i deration a nd reflect i on 
of the subjects' lives i n the light of thei r deaths . 
The follow i ng instr uct i ons were g i ven: "Yot.; have just 
d i ed- - and a percept i ve friend i s writ i ng a personal letter 
to a good friend of his, telling him of your death and 
reflecting on you and your li fe. Wr i te this letter a s 
thcugh you were your friend, speak i ng of yourself ir the 
third person and past tense. Spend a c ouple of mi nutes 
reflecting on yourself as dead from the viewpo i nt of your 
friend and beg in writing when you are ready. Any questions?" 
Th e subjects then spent varying amounts of time putting them-
selves irto th i s s ituation and then wrote the letter 
referr i ng to themselves a s having d i ed. Thi" procedure 
i mp~ ici t ly suggests death a s be ing the end to one ' s life-
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projects, goals, 'relat i onsh ips, etc. It is left to the 
subject as to whether he/she will experience such end as a 
completion to life or as an interruption or any other 
possible mean i ng. Speak i ng about him-/herself in the past 
tense from a ,'fr iend' s perspective also faci li tates a 
confrontation with the real i ty of oneself and one's life 
as ending. 
When all had f ini shed wr i ting, the research s i tuation wa s 
ccmpleted by asking the subjects to again write an es say 
entitled ' Wh at my own death means to me,' followed by a 
comma and their own name. They were a sked to write the 
essay as they felt 'now' and not to refer to their previous 
essay . Apart from further clarifying the meaning that 
death has for each of them, th i s essay also allowed a 
consideration of whether confrontation with death thro ugh 
the procedures facilitated a more immediate exper i ence of 
f i nitude th a n their initial reflection on 'what my own 
death means to me' by a comparison of the two essays. 
For the sake of brevity and convenience each written 
response to the p r ocedures will be de picted in each of the 
s ix protocols according to the following lettered ascriptions: 
A I n i tial reflection on 'what my own death means to me' 
B The exper i ence of constituting and telling the other : 
'I see you a s dy i ng' 
C The exper i ence of const i tuting oneself and being to l d 
by the other, 'I see you a s dying' 
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D The experience of constituting and tell i ng the o+'her : 
'I see you as living' 
E The experience of constituting oneself a nd being told 
by the other: ' I see you as living' 
F T he experience of the procedure in which subjects are 
called to death from their interaction of singing 
G The des c ription and experience of their postural move -
ments of death and dying 
H The letter which describes him- /herself a s dead 
I Terminal refl e ction on 'what my own death means to me' 
It will be noted that all the procedures we r e open - ended, 
both in terms of their possible experiential responses a s 
well a s their poss i ble written form. The specific implicit 
emphases of the procedures wished to r eve a l death a s an 
authentic dimension of existence but did not suggest the 
specific ways in which subjects would respond to being 
confronted with such potential realities. All pro c edures 
suggested real implications of death: i.e. that death is 
c ertain ; that de a th occ urs in an interpersonal context : 
that one d i es one's OWn de a th : that death occurs within 
a n embodied conte x t : that death may come at any time . 
These are all part of the phenomenon a nd, in facilitating 
confrontation with such phenomenon , were im plicitly 'there ' 
for confrontation. The protocols are not mere reflections 
on the word ' death ' or 'finitude' but describe the 
experlence of confronting one's finitude in meaningfully 
conte x tua l modes . Thus we attempt to eli c it reflections 
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on lived - experience rather than reflections which are not 
real to the personal lives of the subjects involved . 
Confrontation with death was put into the context of their 
personal lives rather than leaving it as a vague term which 
either mayor may not be considered within such context . 
The in i tial reflections on 'what my own death means to me ' 
mayor may not be based on the lived - experience of their own 
lives . Their later reflections after considering death 
within such context may clarify what this i nitial reflection 
constituted--whether a reflection based on lived experience 
or not , or a change In such lived experience in one's 
orientation towards death . Whatever emerges here , the 
entire research s i tuation may be analysed to essential ly 
yield the experience of confronting one's finitude through a 
consideration of death . 
3.5 Method of Explication . 
The protocols were analysed according to five stages which 
yielded an essential description of the experience of f i ni -
tude through a confrontation of death as well as data 
concerning the unique personal context of such experience. 
A c hievi~ a Sense of the Wholeness and Relatedness 
.9.i.~acb.--.!:rotocoL£y_a_£~eading~£om the Ac!or 
Pers~tiv~. 
Phenomenological research lS engaged research . It involves 
the researcher in an interpersonal situ at ion , in which he is 
attempting to understand fellow human beings. In acknowledging 
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this, h i s mode of i nvolvement i n the enquiry process becomes 
i mportant and he therefore prepa res himself for such un~er -
stand i ng. I n an i nitial reading of the protocols, the 
researcher attempts to assume the actor perspect i ve of 
personal mean i ng as i t shows itself. The researcher i s thus 
' there for ' the d a ta and to th i s degree brac kets h i s own 
preconcept i ons and judgements. He wi shes to underst a nd the 
subje c ts ' e x peri en c e from the subjects ' point of v iew. 
After ach i ev i ng a holist i c sense of the subjects' exper i ence , 
the protocols a r e then read aga i n , th i s t i me i n a more 
reflect i ve att i tude i n order to prepa r e oneself for the 
art ic ulat i on of wh a t i s e xpressed i n the protocols a ccord i ng 
to i ts own me a n i ngs. 
" the researcher outs i de of the experimental 
s i tuat i on re a ds the transcribed protocols f i rst 
wi th the att i tude of re - l i v i ng the experimenta l 
s i tuat i on and then wi th the att i tude of 
ref l ect i ng on the l i ved situation to under -
stand what h a ppened " 
(Sardel l o i n Gi org i et aI, 1971 , p . 63 ) 
Such read i ngs of the proto c ols also prepares one fo r 
reta i n i ng a sense of the i r i ntegral wholeness throughout the 
further stages , wh ere a more part ic ul a r ana l ys i s i s requ i red . 
Stage 2 The Del i neation of ' Natura l Mean i n g Units ' . 
The data wa s broken down i nto segments ea c h of wh i ch 
expressed a discrete and separate me a ning. Here the protocols 
rema i ned i n the i r or i g i nal state of express i on. However , 
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each statement or series of statements which addressed itself 
to a central theme was numbered as a separate 'natural 
meaning unit'. 'Natural meaning units' convey a single 
intentional meaning and occur implicitly as the subject 
describes different aspects of his/her experience. 
In delineating the 'natural meaning units'. the criterion 
adhered to was that the descriptive statement or statements 
of the person express a different quality or meaning than 
the statements before or after i t. Because of the context-
ual nature of meaning , mean i ngs may often over la p. The 
criterion for delineat in g a 'natural meaning un i t' in such 
a case is whether the statement h i ghlights any new quality 
or aspect of the experience not previously expressed. 
I f this i s so, a d isc retely separate ' natural meaning unit 
i s delineated'. In this way the richness of the data was 
exposed for further analysis in the follow i ng stages. 
Intersubjective validity for the delineation of naturally 
occu ring meaning units was obtained through consultation 
with a colleague also i nvolved in phenomenological research. 
Here the criterion was that both of us de l ineate the same 
'natural meaning un i ts ' in five pages of the protocol 
descriptions. The concern was not to statistically isolate 
a random sample of the 'natural meaning units ' but rather 
to enquire i ntersubjectively whether the ' natural mean in g 
units' may be seen to arise i ndependent of the reflections 
of my own personal exper i ence. To this end I asked the 
colleage to read through f iv e pages of the protocol to see 
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whether he d i ffered wi th the del i neat i on of ' natura l 
meaning un i ts ' . In th i s way it may be sa i d that such 
del i neation occured natur a lly as a movement of mean in g in 
the protocols and not just i n my own exper i ence . 
Stage 3 Descript i on of ' Natural Meaning Units ' in Terms 
~f the i r Central Themes. 
I n this stag e r e dundancies of express i on are el i mi nated i n 
each natu ral mean in g un i t i n order to yield the central 
theme of that unit i n terms of i ts own categories. Whereve r 
possible , the subje c ts ' own words were a dhered to i n order 
to ' let the d a t a speak for i tself ' . However, the i nter -
subjective nature of the l i ved - world suggests that we can 
understand e ac h other's meanings and as such may art i cu l ate 
the centra l theme i n other words wh i ch may essent i ally 
express the i ntended meaning. Here the task i nvolves an 
"articulation of the central themes th a t character i sed the 
respective unfold i ng scenes of each protocol. " 
( Fi s ch er , 1974, p. 414). The criterion for validity i n this 
stage i s not whether an other researcher would use exactly 
the same words in express i ng the central theme , but whether 
such differenc es in wording may be intersubjectively under -
stood to reflect a un i ty and adequacy of the ' natural 
meaning un i t ' as expressed by the subje c t. Su c h validation. 
(five pages of a protocol) was again ac hieved through 
consultat i on with the colleage used i n the prev i ous stage. 
Th e reade r, ad opt ing the outl i nes of this stage should also 
be able to see how the central themes reflect the i ntent i onal 
mean i ng of the subject. 
~tage 4 
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Essential Themes of Each Procedure obta ined through 
a Relating and Clustering of Central Themes between 
Subjects within Ide nt ical Procedures. 
In this stage, all central themes were accounted for in order 
to obtain a reflection of both essentiality and uniqueness. 
Every central theme in every protocol was 'related to and 
clustered wi th ' (Eppel, 1 976) other central themes of the 
same procedure, both within the same subject and between the 
different subjects. The essential themes thus reflect 
sta tements that were constituted from common themes between 
a nd within subjects. Tho se central themes which were only 
reflected once or reflected a number of times but by the same 
subje c t only, wer e nevertheless noted as such. Thus next to 
the essential themes within each procedure, we have a column 
i n which is depicted how many different subjects contributed 
to the relating and clustering of that particular essential 
theme. Next to each statement is depicted the person as well 
a s the central theme number from which the essential theme 
was constructed. Thus next to each essential theme, i s the 
central theme number prefixed by the i n i tials of the person 
referred to, e.g. R.B.6. I f the essential theme i s 
of the procedure relating to the posture of death (G), the 
reader may refer to R.B. ' s protocol, procedure G, central 
theme 6 and f i nd one of the sources wh ich contributed to 
an essential theme of that procedure. The concern was to 
clar i fy the experience of each procedure and in so do i ng, 
both essential and unique themes emerged. The unique themes 
are themes expressed by only one person, although possib l y 
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more than once by him , and wi ll thus have the number 1 i n 
the column after the essential theme as well as the referred-
to central themes as described above. No central theme was 
thus ig nored i n the constitut i on of th i s stage and all may 
be traced via the above method as arriving in the essent ial 
theme phase. By keep i ng the essent ia l themes of each 
procedure separate, d i scuss i on may be pursued on the nature 
of the procedures and the ir relative contribut i on to the 
essential descr ip tion of the experience of confronting one ' s 
f i nitude through a consideration of deat h . 
Arrival at the Essential D escriptio~!_the 
~erie nce of Confronting One's Finitude 
through a Cons id eration of De at h. 
A radical reflection on both the sense of the protoco l s as 
a whole as well a s on the essential themes yielded a n 
essential description of the exper ience of confronting 
one's f i nit ude through a c onsiderat io n of death. Su ch 
essent ia l description embod i ed at least all essent ial 
themes wh i ch referred to three or more people. 
Statements of the essential description are thus backed up 
by referents to the essential themes in brackets . For 
example , the referent I I, as one essential theme, was 
constituted by central themes from all s i x subjects and 
thus contributes to the essent ia l descr i pt i on. Other 
essential themes wh ic h refer to less than three subjects 
but which made the essent ial descr iption more explicit, 
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were al so used to c ontr ib ute to the essential structure o f 
the phenomenon. It wil l be noted that the essent i al 
description e mb od i es a des cription relating to the 
subjects' own exper i en ce s an d reflect i ons and does not make 
use of i nferred i ntr ap sych ic or environmental structures 
which may explain su ch ex perience. Thus, tr ue t o the 
phenomenological enterprise , the essentia l descript i on 
ma i ntained a n actor perspective with i n h i s/her c onte x t of 
th e lived wor l d . 
Through the above methodo lo gical descr ip t i on , the reader 
may judge for h i mself the 'line of des c ent' through the 
stages. 
A cons i deration of the un i que context of the exper i ence of 
c onfronting one ' s f i n i tude is attempted i n the 'discus s ion' 
sect i on and may more clearly place the phenomenon stud ied 
in its l i ved-world context . The result s will also be 
in terrogated in terms of quest i ons which ma y further el uci -
date the nature of human finitude and our relatedness to 
de a th . 
7B 
4 Analysis of Results 
4.1 ~~~sis into Natural Mean ing Units and Central Theme. 
Pro-
ce -
dure 
No. : 
A 
Natural Meaning Un its Central Themes 
R. B. 
1 I t means something between 1 a mb ivalence between 
fulfillment and defeat . defeat of death due to 
I should die, and I try pride of living and un-
to live towards that dying timely death, and f ul -
but I'm also rather too fillment of death as 
proud to d i e, especially someth i ng to live towards. 
if that death is untimely. 
2 I n terms of death a s an 2 meta physical questions 
end or as a new begin - ab out death as a begin -
ning, I'm not sure , but ning or end unimportant. 
find these metaphysical 
questions unimportant. 
3 Instead if I can live ' 3 death as a 'course of 
my life fully, then things' if he lives life 
death will be part of fully - a return to 
the cour s e of things. origins. 
Death i s essentially a 
return to origins, to 
B I 
the primal matter (and 
mo the r ) out of which I 
was born. 
She was s itting, should -
ers slight ly slou ched, 
and when I sa id the a bOIl.e 
she seemed to be mu ch 
older and slouch even 
more , a s though she had 
sat in that chair for 
fifty years. 
2 The time before I spent 
talking to her was to 
realise th at someone so 
young can die, for when 
I finally sa i d "June, I 
see you as dying", I 
really meant it. 
C I I felt my dying i mme -
diately; a nd i t started 
in my stomach, a slight 
knot then almost a sort 
of disintegration, st ill 
i n my stomach. 
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I slouching of other's body 
as aging fifty years. 
2 r e alisation of ' someon e 
so young can die '. 
I im mediate bod ily response 
in stomach a s 'k not ' and 
'disi ntegration' . 
2 There was movement up my 
back, not as strong as a 
shudder or anything, and 
much slower. 
J3 Then I felt my neck 
muscles tighten slightly 
and my head began to 
ache. 
4 My breathing was constant 
throughout though I was 
concentrating on i t a s 
such but I've still got 
a sl i ght headache. 
D 1 Her greyness left her and 
she seemed to glow golden. 
2 She also moved away from 
me, out into life. 
3 And I loved to see her 
go--so full of energy and 
power. 
Ell did n't feel anything; 
what R said came across 
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2 movement up back, slower 
than shudder. 
3 tightening of neck mus-
cles and aching of head. 
4 aware of breathing a s 
con stant. 
1 other moving from 'grey-
ness' to glowing golden. 
2 other moving away from 
self into life. 
3 enjoyment of seein g 
other a s 'full of energy 
and power'. 
1 lack of impac t of pro -
cedure through already 
a little flat. I felt 
far too much alive for it 
to be meaningful, and 
that aliveness came from 
when I willed R life just 
now. 
2 But I definitely feel 
stronger than before we 
started this series--"I 
see you as dy i ng" and "I 
see you as living." 
F 1 Didn't seem very meaning -
ful, yet the tautness in 
my body says i t was so. 
2 Mostly it was enjoyable; 
I so l i ke singing and 
hearing others s i ng too. 
3 When I was killed I still 
wanted to sing and didn't 
like hav i ng to keep quiet. 
4 I was surpr i sed that some 
of the others in the group 
Bl 
feeling 'aliv eness' by 
granting other life in 
previous procedure. 
2 feels stronger now than 
before starting the 
procedures. 
1 tautness of body contra -
dicts structuring of 
meaninglessness of 
procedure. 
2 enjoyed participat i on in 
sing i ng. 
3 on being 'killed ' aware 
of wish to continue 
singing with others. 
4 surprise at embarrassment 
of other singing especially 
felt so embarrassed at 
hav i ng to s i ng, especially 
i n the moment after some -
body had just d ie d. 
G I Wh i le thinking about it, 
I thought of dying 
violently, in a hail of 
mach i ne - gun bullets, but 
then that disappeared . 
2 How I died I don't know 
but I didn't want to die. 
My shoulders and back 
heaved and arched,still 
strong and fighting 
against the return to 
st il lness . 
3 Then I subsided and 
stretched out for the 
Mother to take me again, 
but just before I d i ed, 
my finger again half 
closed, completely spon -
raneously, and that is 
how I died, somewhere 
between acceptance and 
fight. 
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in Imoment after some -
body had just died' . 
1 Initial thought of a 
violent death which 
then disappeared. 
2 resi stance to death as 
'arc h i ng of back ' as 
's trong' and 'fighting 
against stillness'. 
3 acceptance of death as 
'stretching out for 
mother' contradicted by 
final bodily res i s -
tance--'died between 
a cceptance and f i ght '. 
4 It was not so much a fear 
of death that made for 
this anger of mine but a 
s i mple and profound will 
to live. 
H 1 He (R) was so young in 
years, young and strong 
and growing, and he was 
cut down, brushed aside 
by the fates, just like 
that. His will was too 
young to die. 
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4 'p r ofound wil l to live' 
as anger at death rather 
than fear. 
1 death as be ing 'cut 
down' of one so 'young'. 
2 Yet there was a nother side 2 als o sees the other side 
to him; he was an !t o ld 
soul" a s his father had 
always said. He was one 
of those people who seemed 
to have been born old, and 
even when he was very young 
the dark bru i ses under his 
eyes showed . This s i de of 
him was beyond the ener -
getic counting of years, 
and it was this side which 
he sought to realise fully 
in his own life. 
to self--a s 'old' in non -
chronological sense--
validated by his father 
and his appearance. 
3 So I think it would be 
wrong to curse God for 
removing someone so 
young, or with so much 
life ahead of him. To 
be true to his spirit 
I shall not count the 
years or the possi -
bilities that might have 
been. 
4 But I shall try to take 
his youth and strength, 
and his agelessness, and 
keep the work of wedding 
them. For that i s one 
thing he taught me, that 
wisdom and the s triving 
of youth are not the 
opposites some take them 
to be. 
5 Finally it was always his 
belief that the end of 
life and the beginning of 
life are inseparable. 
True, he did not fully 
live that belief (that 
was his "youthfulness"). 
84 
3 in considering life, 
does not use chrono-
logical age or possible 
future as 'wrongfulness' 
of death. 
4 Youth and agelessness as 
two sides of him. 
5 belief that 'end and 
'beginning'of life are 
inseparable. 
6 but still it would be so 
wrong , I think , to mourn 
him; rather we should 
give thanks to the powers 
that gave him, and then 
let him be. 
I 1 I t is very difficult to 
say , more difficult than 
earlier on . 
2 In a sense it means 
noth ing to me, but that 
might be misinterpreted 
as meaning unimportant. 
De ath is not really the 
problem, life i s . 
3 My death lS a realisation 
of the joy, importance 
and wonder of living now , 
and In th e t ime s before I 
die. I don't mean I must 
pour all my energies into 
life , manically trying to 
do as much as possible --
not that a t all. 
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6 le t things be rather 
than mourn his death . 
1 meaning of death has 
become more difficult 
to verbalise than 
earlier. 
2 death means noth ing in 
terms of the problem of 
life. 
3 Death as a realisation of 
' joy, importance and 
wonder of living now . 
4 I'm not aware of dying or 
death , but only of life. 
D • R • 
A 1 I conceive of my death as 
the end of a physical 
cycle of my existence. 
2 It holds, at this stage , 
no great fear for me, 
though at times when I 
was closer to it than 
others, my concept i ons 
changed. 
3 I have no ambitions to 
have a c hieved something 
great by the t ime it 
arrives, but wish to 
feel I have grown. 
4 My death plays no role 
i n my co ns cious wak ing 
life, neither when I am 
in a receptive state for 
wider cosmological 
processes . 
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4 ' not aware of dying or 
death, but only of life'. 
1 death as death of bodily 
existe nc e. 
2 fear of death when close 
to it. 
3 no great ambitions to 
achieve ' someth ing great' 
by arrival of death, but 
feeli ng of growth is 
wished in cour se of life. 
4 death plays no role in 
c onsc iou s wak i ng life . 
5 However. I apperceive 
that it will hera ld the 
onset of a significant 
new pha se. one which I 
cannot properly conce i ve 
of. 
6 I too recogn i se that 
living consc io usly in 
the face of my death 
al lows me greater 
fle xibili ty of action 
and serves to qualita -
tive ly i mprove my now. 
7 I ntellectual l y I ca n 
conceive of it a s a 
great link of beings 
and as such welcome. 
B 1 Not as strong a link. 
I d id not th i nk I could 
see him as dy i ng . 
2 But when I f ix ed my look 
at a certain point he 
faded and fel l. I felt 
very distanced for some 
of the time especially at 
his death. 
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5 death as onset of new 
sign i f i cant phase which 
cannot be con ceived of. 
6 living consciously in 
face of death allows 
greater flexibility of 
ac tion and qual i tative 
i mprovement of the present. 
7 Intellectually. welcomes 
death as 'gr e at link of 
beings '. 
1 Initial inability to see 
'o ther' as dy ing. 
2 felt d i stanced from other 
'at his death'. 
3 It was not very difficult 
to know when the time was 
right for me to see him as 
dying --i t was quite clear. 
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3 able to see other as 
dying after a while as 
'quite clear'. 
C I I felt that he may not say I appreciation of other's 
it. I appreciated it 
greatly when he did. 
2 I felt a very strong bond 
of friendship. He became 
terribly real , terribly 
al iv e. I was not really 
aware of myself-- my focus 
was on him and his be i ng -
ness. 
3 My arm and hand stiffened 
markedly at and after he 
told me that he saw me as 
dying. 
4 somehow I felt a remark -
able truthfulness not in 
the actual statement but 
in the interaction. 
dilemma of having to see 
self-as - dying. 
2 aware of other as friend, 
'real' and alive without 
focus on self. 
3 stiffening of arm and hand 
as response to statement. 
4 felt truthfulness in the 
interaction. 
D I It was difficult to focus 
on what was alive. s. was 
alive but I knew him to be 
more real and alive than I 
was seeing him at that 
moment. 
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I Initial inabil ity to see 
' other ' as alive and real 
as he had known him. 
2 But as I looked longer and 2 with looking longer 'a live-
I be ca me more tuned in to 
his being alive it became 
clearer and definite that 
he was alive--his eyes were 
alive and strong -- that's 
where his life emerged 
from --al so his forehead. 
~ess ' of other m~re =lenr 
and definite as communica t-
ed by other's eyes and 
forehead. 
E I It was good that 5. saw me I appreciation of being seen 
as living relatively soon. 
2 I could see him really 
look i ng for the life in 
me. His eyes are honest. 
F ] Surprised when I was 
called. Sorry to leave 
the liv i ng. 
'as living' relatively 
soon. 
2 other seen as life-
val i dating and honest as 
communicated by eyes. 
I surprise and regret at 
being called and leaving 
the liv i ng. 
2 Big shock when 5 . was 
ca lled. 
3 Could have c arr i ed on 
s ingi ng for a l ong time. 
4 Once I had d ied, I q uit e 
en joyed stand i ng and 
watc hi ng . Felt 
entirely self - possessed --
l iving and dead . Was not 
terr ib ly aware of the 
others arou nd me . 
5 Would have liked to ha ve 
been the last ali ve , 
while I was st ill alive. 
But this feeling evap -
orated once I had 
actually died. 
6 I was basically only 
aware of myself dur i ng 
the whole procedure . 
G 1 To be crouch ed foetus -
like on y our side. 
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2 Shock when o t her was 
called . 
3 elab orat i on on meaning of 
(1) - surprise and regret 
at being called. 
4 enjoyed distan ce from 
others at deat h. 
5 wish to ha ve been last 
a l ive but s ur rendered 
this wish a fte r death. 
6 on ly aware of self dur i ng 
procedure. 
1 body in foetus pos i tion 
i n process of dy i ng. 
2 - to recoil briefly as 
life escapes you. 
3 - then to re lax, stretch 
slightly and finally come 
to a position of rest , on 
your s i de, straighter 
than the closed foetus, 
but foetus-like, but 
slightly open i.e. more 
of your back touch in g the 
ground than completely 
s i de - on, wi th your face 
sl i ghtly upward. 
H 1 Dear J, Before I start 
tell in g you about other 
experiences and thoughts 
I wish to c ommunicate to 
you , I'd like to write 
br ie fly about a friend of 
mine who has just died. 
I write this fo r a number 
of reasons, one of the 
pri nci ple ones being that 
you are a woma n, and I 
think he would have liked 
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2 bodily res i stance to 
death as ' to recoil 
briefly'. 
3 final accep tance of death 
as body in pos it ion of 
rest, ' foetus - like, but 
slightly open'. 
1 wish to be remembered by 
feminine person . 
to have been reconstru c t -
ed by another , of the fe w 
truly fem i n i ne persons 
around. 
2 Dick d i ed at 26 . I n some 
ways he was much older 
than this , part of that 
age in which clock time 
has no place; in other 
respects he was far 
younger - but mainly he 
was twenty-s i x. 
3 He had a depth of passion 
few recognised and at the 
t i me of h i s death was 
beg i nning to develop a 
sort of jaggedness, a sort 
of hardness, fore i gn to 
his entire past. In some 
senses he was more woman 
than man . 
He always told me about 
h i s earl i er life, as a 
child and as a young boy--
about how he would expose 
himself i n lov i ng so open l y 
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2 felt both older and 
YGunger than chronolo-
gical age in different 
respects. 
3 at t i me of death develop -
ment of a 'hardness ' foreign 
to his past self as 
passionate, feminine and 
self - exposing. 
so completely, to those 
who penetrated him. 
4 He told me especially 
about one woman who 
embodied womanhood for 
him, and talked t ire-
lessly of the femininity 
of the Alexandria 
Quartet. I mention 
th i s one woman, J, with 
Durrell's books because 
in his mi nd they were 
of t i mes synonamous. 
5 At times he would be at 
peace wi th the world i n 
such a complete way, 
truly experiencing the 
un i ty of the co smos, 
realis i ng his total in -
significance and at once 
his supreme i mportance 
in the working of things. 
6 If I write too pass i on -
ately of him, it is 
because I loved this 
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4 sharing of value of 
'womanhood' . 
5 times of peace and 
fulfilment in relation -
ship to the world. 
6 this side valued highly 
but 'put a s ide while 
new growth emerged'. 
side-- th i s side which was 
to lead him into mu c h 
pains a nd joy-- but also 
was to be put aside while 
a new growth emerged . 
7 At the t i me of his death I 
ment i oned the emergent 
jaggedness of h i s being, 
a sharpness, an i ntoleran c e, 
a more closed privacy, at 
times a n i mpenetrabili ty, 
which he claimed was in -
ev ita ble and necessary for 
his "bal ance tl • He often 
used the analogy of a 
mus ical i nstrument when 
t a lking of h i s l i fe -- and 
spoke of the tunedness of 
h i s be i ng. He ha d a 
pecul i ar object iv eness 
about h i s self, l i ving 
s id e by s i de wi th a total 
subjectivity . 
8 But I labour his assets. 
He claimed to be weak on 
oc ca s ion s, i ns i ncere, even 
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7 meaning in (3) seen as 
'inev i table and ne c essary 
for his II balance " l • 
8 self - judgements also as 
we ak, untruthful, doubt -
i ng inner validity. 
untruthful. He spent 
long hours depressed, 
doubting his inner 
va l idity--reality. r 
sometimes used to think 
these vicious self-
judgements valid--some-
t i mes not. 
9 But mainly r think he was 
frightened like you and r, 
of tak i ng full respon -
s i bility for his emergent 
being- - that which he knew 
had to be. In this sense 
he died too soon, or 
perhaps God knew ... 
10 We'll talk of him again 
sometime. Let me now 
describe the beauty of the 
pastel beach awaiting me 
beyond this window. 
I 1 It appears to be weirdly 
i mpersonal. 
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9 died too soon, before he 
could take full 
responsibility for his 
emergent being. 
10 move onto a description 
of beach beyond the 
window. 
1 death as 'weirdly 
impersonal' . 
2 It is much more real as 
being very valuable to 
my life. I see more 
clearly, the function of 
a limit--even th e function 
of our limited conscious -
ness -- it circumscribes 
our understanding poten-
t ialities, as death does 
our life 's potential i ties. 
We move in spirals, each 
turn of which is necessary 
as a limit for our dimen -
sional climb. Death 
demarcates one light - dark 
turn of the spiral -- we 
function within limits 
3 until such time as those 
limits recede into limit -
lessness. 
96 
2 death valuable to life as 
limit which defines life's 
potential and within which 
life moves . 
3 time when limits 'reced e 
i nto limitlessness '. 
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R. J. 
A 1 My death means the end and 1 death as end and fulfil -
fulfilment of my life. ment of her life. 
2 I think of it as part of a 2 death as part of natural 
natural process towards process . 
which I am always moving. 
3 Something whic h gives 3 gives meaning to living 
meaning to the time I am now. 
living now . 
4 My death is not something 
I think about often -
there have been certain 
t i mes and events that 
have brought its reality 
home , and have led me to 
accept it as the end of 
my physical bei~g. 
5 I am not afraid of th e 
fact of my dying, but am 
scared of the way of dying 
4 closer to death at certain 
times during life . 
5 more afraid of pa i n in 
dying than fact of death. 
- dying in pain, for 
instance. It's the 
pa i n that frightens me . 
not t he dying . 
6 I feel I would betray 
my life if I denied the 
reality of my death. 
B I My first thought was to 
see R as old and dying and 
falling to piec es, but 
that didn't work. 
2 50 then I let myself 
become aware of his dying 
every second I was look-
ing at him, dying a 
little each moment and 
then I could say: " R, I 
see you as dying," and 
mean it. 
3 I d idn ' t find it easy to 
say, though; my v o ice 
and my breathing was a 
bit jerky . 
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6 denial of death as 
betrayal o f he r Ii fe. 
I Initial failure at 
attempt to see other as 
'old and dying and falling 
to pieces'. 
2 able to see o ther as 
'dying a little each 
moment' as meaningful. 
3 difficult y in verbal -
ising statemen t - as 
jerkiness of voice and 
breathing. 
C I When R looked straig ht at 
me, and said he saw me as 
dying , I got an a lmo st 
phys ical s ho c k , though 
II shock " is a bit too 
strong . I felt my 
mus c l es slightly tense and 
shiver , and my ha nds 
jerked. 50 I was very 
much aware of a physical, 
emot±onal rea c tion rather 
than an intel l ectural one. 
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I bodily reaction to state -
ment as tensing and 
shivering of muscles , 
rather than intellectual 
response. 
D I I didn't f i nd this difficult I Easily able to see other 
to say, because I just had 
t o look at R to see him as 
vibrant wi th lif e and 
energy and love of life. 
2 and wanted to say it to 
tell him so . 
E I R d i dn't take as long to 
say he saw me as living, 
and I was wonder i ng before 
he said it, how he would 
see me as liv ing. 
as ' vibrant with l i fe and 
energy a nd love of life. ' 
2 wish to tell other this. 
I questioning of how other 
would see self as liv i ng . 
2 My reaction was one of 
JOY and wonder, even, 
and happiness, almost as 
if I had been given a 
lovely present. 
F 1 I didn't really enjoy the 
singing at first , but got 
to enjoy myself pretty 
fast . I didn't sing to a 
lot of people, but I liked 
having the sound of their 
singing with mine, and 
also to having them sing -
ing with me . 
2 When L died, the first 
one, I noticed how we all 
stopped for a moment, and 
sang together in a small 
tight - knit group for a 
little while . 
3 then we started moving 
about more and the other 
people's deaths weren't 
such a shock for me . 
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2 reaction of self to state -
ment of I joy I, I wo nder I , 
'happiness', of being 
'given a lovely present'. 
1 Enjoyed participation of 
singing to and with others 
after initial reluctance. 
2 after first death noticed 
hesitancy and increase of 
physical proximi ty of 
group before continuing. 
3 other ' s deaths were less 
of shock . 
4 R ' s was because he was 
sing i ng to me when he 
died and I felt a little 
lost for a while having 
to go and join up with 
the others aga i n . 
5 I was almost relieved 
at my own death, because 
I can ' t sing and was very 
self - conscious on my own . 
I feel that i f the 
exercise had been made 
of some other activi ty 
(e . g. playing a flute), 
I would have been less 
disturbed about carrying 
on on my own . I would 
have WANTED to have gone 
on living , but i n th i s 
exerc ise I was too self -
cons c ious about the sing-
i ng part . 
6 But that hang - up wasn't 
the only thing I suppose. 
I was also very conscious 
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4 felt lost when other was 
singing to 'died ' and had 
to rejoin group. 
5 felt self- conscious on 
being last one alive due 
to self - consciousness i n 
s i ng i ng . 
6 felt alone and certai n of 
death . 
of being totally alo ne, 
and certain that I was 
going to die soon . 
7 I think my dying was a 
little different from 
the others because I 
knew when I was going 
to die and didn't have 
the same apprehension 
and doubt as them. 
My death wasn ' t such a 
shock to me , it didn't 
c ut i nto the mi ddle of 
something , but came at 
the end. Everyone had 
gone and now i t was my 
tu rn . 
GIl imagine the movement 
of dying as a tension , 
a sudden drawing in 
and closing in on my -
self. 
2 and then gradually 
moving and opening , 
outwards and upwards . 
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7 less apprehension because 
of certainty of death 
after everyone else had 
gone . 
1 movement of dying as 
tension, closing in. 
2 then a movement open ing 
outwards and upwards . 
3 The French word for dying 
1S ' agonie' (whi<i:>h doesn't 
mean our ' agony) but it 
describes, for me , that 
last violent jerking in -
wards which precedes the 
gentle relaxation, and 
opening into the rested 
dying posture , which is 
how I picture my dying 
posture, and noticed 1n 
D's and G' s as well . It is 
a final holding on, and 
then, letting go. 
H 1 I t is Friday afternoon, 
We and R has just died. 
have been very close 
friends for 10 years , 
and done a lot of grow -
ing together, and it's 
going to be very hard 
getting used to not 
having her around any -
more. But, I'm so happy 
for her that she was at 
where she was at when 
she died. 
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3 a violent jerking inwards 
as holding on 
b followed by 'gentle' 
relaxation ' as ' letting 
go' . 
1 happiness at having grown 
to 'where she was at when 
she died'. 
2 R was a lonely, shy, very 
quiet little girl when I 
first knew her, and for a 
long time after that , but 
she has let herself open 
out and be more and more so 
over the past few years . 
3 In a way her career at 
University helped that. 
There were lots of ideas 
and influences and seeds 
planted which she chewed 
over , and could then 
really assimilate and use 
in herself. 
4 But I also feel that 
Varsity stultified and 
stifled her at times --
she couldn't get out of 
her head, and was 
frightened and trapped, 
and afraid that the 
other things she was 
capable of being were 
being atrophied. 
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2 growth from a lonely , 
shy, quiet ~irl to a 
more 'open' person. 
3 Univ ersity as helping 
gr ow th through assimi -
lation of ideas. 
4 University also as 
stifling phase. 
5 But, you know, that 
strangled phase, she 
managed to pull herself 
out of, and has let 
herself go in all sorts 
of other directio ns, 
that were, I felt , 
always there, but only 
showed to her family 
and friends she grew 
very cl ose to. 
6 50 R died when she had 
grown a lot in many 
ways-- she was centred 
in herself , though the 
peripheries were often 
shaky . 
7 she had a gentleness 
and capaci ty for loving, 
and giving wh ich made 
her too vulnerable at 
times . 5he knew that 
though, and accepted her 
vulnerability, and an y 
suffering th at came to 
her. From a time when 
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5 managed to let herself to 
in other directions wh ich 
she had only previously 
shared with her family 
and friends . 
6 death at time of having 
defeated many restrictions 
to personal growth. 
7 growth to a point where 
she could accept her 
vulnerability and accept 
suffering. 
she used to try and block 
pain, when she was mu ch 
younger, she reached a 
point where she could 
accept and suffer suffer -
ing and grow through it. 
8 But that doesn't mean 
she'd reached a high 
point and couldn't have 
gone anywhere further, 
hadn ' t she died today. 
There were still a lot 
of confusions in R, a 
lot of places in herself 
she hadn't found and was 
trying to find. I'd 
have liked her to get 
there before she died. 
9 but that ' s a futile kind 
of thought. She died 
when it was time; all 
the unfinished bits and 
pieces in her are 
finished now, in her 
dying. 
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8 wish to develop further 
and sort out confusions 
before she died. 
9 futility of regret of 
unfinished b its and 
pieces which are finished 
in her dying. 
lIMy own death i s some -
thing th a t I ha v e 
become ver y conscious 
of now . 
2 I conceive it as a 
part of my Ii fe, I am 
dying all the time 
really , and when I 
finally die , it will 
be the con c lusion and 
fulfilment of my life. 
3 My death , I see a s 
glvlng meaning to my 
life . 
4 it lS part of the 
natural cycle of my 
being , a nd I can 
accept it as such. 
5 I feel to deny it 
would be to deny my 
life , so I cannot live 
fully unless I a c cept 
the fact of my death . 
Unless I live my dying , 
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1 become very c onscious of 
own death . 
2 death as part of life , as 
conclusion a nd fulfilment 
of life . 
3 gives meaning to life . 
4 accepts death as part of 
natural cyc Ie. 
5 a c ceptance of ' fact of 
my death ' leads to a 
fullness in living. 
6 
which these exerClses 
have helped me to do . 
I have also realised that 
to fear th e pain of death 
is also a denial of life; 
it means I am not living 
my time, so I feel th at 
I don ' t fear the pain of 
death now. It is also 
part of the cycle. 
G.1. 
A 1 It is the cessation of 
everything I particularly 
am aware of. 
2 It is the ultimate rule 
of my games. 
3 It is the crowning riddle 
to existence in the 
Universe. 
4 Thought of it, remem-
brance of it at odd 
moments, streamlines 
my being. It shows me 
I am part of a continuum, 
lOB 
6 does not fear even pain 
of death as this would be 
a denial of life in the 
face of death. 
1 death as 'cessation of 
everything I am particu-
larly aware of'. 
2 death as 'ultimate rule' 
of living. 
3 death as a riddle of 
e x isten c e. 
4 death glves both a sense 
of importance in existing 
and a sense of replace-
ability as part of the 
cycle of nature. 
very important, because 
I exist, but replace-
able (because that is 
how it is) being that I 
am also part of th e birth-
growth - reproduce-death 
cycle I see in plants, 
animals, etc., but 
stunningly so , because it 
includes me, I j oin in~ 
the centre. 
5 I am c ompelled to be with 
and utilise this time In 
between bi~th -death. The 
dark edge of death makes 
this by contrast a spark-
ling jewel. 
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5 importance of life given 
by contrast of death 
which'compels' G to 
utilise his t ime. 
B 1 Imagining death of partner 1 anxiety at picturing 
led to feelings of anxiety 
because I had to picture 
the actual death of L. 
2 As I said it I was aware 
of impact and gravity of 
it on L. It was a scary 
thing to say. 
actual death of other. 
2 felt impact and grav ity 
of statement on other. 
C 1 Was aware of the effort 
L had to put into 
per c eiving me as dying . 
2 I felt as if I was being 
judged, not by L in 
partic ular but by the 
reality of death as 
communicated by L . 
3 felt a heaviness in the 
c hest just before the 
statement . I appre -
ciated my breathing 
bec a use I was dying. 
I ' ll breathe deeply so 
as to show I'm alive . 
4 The impact of the state -
ment itself was not as 
strong as impact of 
silent period before. 
D 1 It lS good to see Lisa 
as living. I saw her 
as b e ing strongly alive. 
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1 effort of other experienced 
in perceiving self as 
dying. 
2 felt ' judged ' by the reality 
of death . 
3 bodily response as 'heavi-
ness in chest ' and focus on 
breathing as an affirmation 
of life . 
4 felt impact at silence 
before the statement . 
1 seeing other as 'strongly 
alive ' experienced as 
'good ' 
2 It was like telling her 
good news, which seemed 
to make her more alive. 
3 Again thinking of the 
statement seemed to have 
more effect than the 
statement itself. 
E 1 It seemed like L enjoyed 
seeing me as living. 
2 It was a good thing to 
hear, and it reinforced 
my well - being. 
F 1 I saw the importance of 
my song when other people 
died. When they were 
gone I had to keep 
going. When they dis -
appeared I saw how it 
was . 
2 We do our own songs and 
hear others, but must do 
our own songs well. 
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2 communicating this to 
other experienced as 
ma ki ng other 'more alive'. 
3 thinking of statement 
as having more impact 
than statement itself. 
lather as enjoying 'seeing 
me as living'. 
2 validation of life from 
other as 'reinforcing my 
well - being ' . 
1 felt importance of 
'keeping going' in light 
of other 's death . 
2 felt importance of doing 
' own songs well'. 
G 1 A last convulsion of 
the muscles in a body 
spasm. Hands clench 
then release. 5ame for 
muscles, spine, neck. 
Release of lungs~-air 
flows out. 
Sharp moan. Convulsed 
body. Writhing. 
Oh God! Release of 
muscles and breathing. 
H 1 Dear P, He was a good 
person. 
2 It lS not worth mourning 
too long for him. He 
wouldn't have wanted it 
that way. He would like 
us to move on and live 
fully and wholeheartedly. 
3 It was a good death. 
He had a natural wisdom 
with which he lived his 
life. He knew what life 
was and therefore he 
faced his death and under-
stood its significance. 
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1 a.bodily resistance as 
spasm of muscles, sharp 
moan, convulsed body 
b.followed by release of 
of breath and muscles. 
1 evaluation of self as 
. good person ' . 
2 wish for others to live 
'fully and wholeheartedly' 
rather than mourn his 
death. 
3 evaluation of self as 
'having natural wisdom' 
and 'facing death with 
understanding ' . 
4 He didn't believe he 
would still be alive 
now as an ethereal G, 
but he wa s there in 
everything he did so 
that he is life . He i s 
the landscapes he loved 
and the flowers he rose 
up wi th. 
5 The lmage of his voice 
and presence will live on 
in the memori es of t has e 
who knew him . 500n that 
will also fade. Only his 
creations wi ll still speak 
to those who are 
interested. 
6 He has gone like we must 
all go, like many have 
gone before us . 
7 Let us move ever on , 
boldly to our highest 
purpose . 
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4 belongingness of self In 
the world as identifica -
tion with life . 
5 survival in memories of 
those who knew him which 
will later fade. 
6 death as going a s 'all 
must go ' . 
7 identification with group 
purpose. 
I 1 My death is a strange, 
almost funny twist in my 
life. I know it is 
absolutely real and un -
denia ble but it is not 
here, so I do not always 
appreciate the fact. 
But sometimes it is as 
real as objects around me, 
as my hands and skin, it 
permeates them. 
2 It sometimes seems that 
my death exists within my 
life, so that the keener 
my life is, the sharper 
the reality of my death . 
3 I like my own death, at 
least the appreciation 
of it . It gives me 
more life. But the 
actual termination I wi l l 
avoid as far as possible . 
5. C. 
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1 sometimes 'death' 1S as 
'real as objects around me' 
but when ' it is not here ' 
do not appreciate its 
reality . 
2 death exists within life --
as keenness of life 
sharpens death's reality . 
3 a.appreciation of aware~ 
ness of d eath as life -
enhanc ing. 
b.but death as an event 
will be avoided. 
A 1 The idea of my death seems 1 death as intellectually 
to be at least intellectu -
ally very meaningful. 
meaningfu 1. 
2 Life seems to me to have 
no intrinsic meanlng or 
value. That value is 
gleaned from a strong 
awareneSS of death. 
3 From the typified exist-
ential vacuum, death 
lodms out as my only 
hope . Death is the reason 
for my continued struggle 
for an acceptance of lif e. 
4 Death will be the ;one 
Journey in which perso nal 
choice is meaningless . 
5 Like life , death will 
have its own force --
neither an end nor a 
beginn ing but a journey 
of powerful knowledge. 
The idea for me is that 
death, with its content 
or annihilation, is the 
final answer, whether it 
be an answer or not . 
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2 death gives life no 
intrinsic meaning . 
3 death offers hope in 
struggle to accept life. 
4 in death personal choice 
is meaningless. 
5 death is potentially 
instructive. 
6 I face dying - -the poten-
tial pain and degradation 
of becoming physically 
incapacitated. But: .deat h 
itself is pleasurable. 
At last there will be a 
certainty which hopefully 
will be that God -given 
feeling of someth in g of 
va lue. 
7 The purpose and meaning 
of my l ife wi ll hopefully 
be sorted out at death. 
8 Early death or suicide 
are not considerations. 
Th is life i s too meaning-
ful merely because it 
wi ll not be e ver l asti ng . 
B 1 Difficult to feel what I 
was saying . I just could 
be holding D ' s hand and 
be looking at his eyes 
and, say , knowing that 
it was the end, Dic k I 
see you as dying. 
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6 dying as potentially 
painful and degrading 
but death is welcomed 
a s offering certainty 
and value. 
7 Hope of purpose and 
meaning of life being 
sorted out at death. 
8 Lack of a verlastin g life 
gives life meaning and 
negates possibility of 
suicide and early death 
as considerations. 
1 I nitial diffi c ulty in 
seeing other a s dying . 
2 Tw ic e I t ri ed but found 
my attention wavering 
and a compulsion to 
swallow. When I did 
say it , something kept 
forcing me to switch 
off. 
3 When I said it, there 
was a feeling of 
acceptance . Almost a 
suppression of emotion. 
Emotion which I truly 
c ouldn ' t feel. 
4 Yet a physical feeling 
in my heart and throat 
which made the act 
difficult. 
5 I kept thinking, D, I 
love you, yet you are 
going to die. Saying 
"I see you as dying " 
made me objec tify him 
even though I was right 
into his eyes . 
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2 wavering attention and 
compulsion to swallow. 
3 with statement came 
'feeling of acceptance' 
as I suppression of emotion ! 
4 difficulty in saying 
statement as physical 
feeling in heart and 
throat. 
5 other as dying as loving 
contact ( i nterpersonal 
closeness) but 'object -
ifying' of other. 
C 
6 The emotive feeling 
between our eyes (our 
experiential sharing) 
was lost in saying the 
words. 
1 Almost a hypnogog ic 
blanking out . It was 
very difficult to 
concentrate on the 
concepts. My attention 
didn't waver. It mere -
ly blanked out at times . 
2 At the beginning I 
didn't think of my death 
until I realised that D 
was going to say 5 , I 
see you as dying. 
3 At times I felt a pang 
which dissolved the 
instant I tried to 
d"Jel l on it. 
4 When he said it, I felt 
a lack of emotion . II 5, 
llS 
6 dist a nce from contact in 
' saying the words'. 
1 blanking out of attention. 
2 anticipation of other's 
statement as making self 
aware of his death. 
3 at times a 'pang' arose 
which dissolved on focus 
on it. 
4 with statement, initia l 
la ck of emotion and 
I see :t0u as dying" came 
as an unbelief of his 
certainty. 
5 Then seeing his emotion, 
I felt curious. Something 
is eluding me. I feel 
that I should feel more 
but I don't . What I don ' t 
know i s that there seems 
to be something denied in 
my emotional experience. 
Yet something feels, 
physically in my heart, 
ready to burst. I feel 
confused yet not certain 
or unknowing. 
D 1 I felt a sense of 
responsibility. 
2 I had the thought of 
delaying saying it so 
as to let Dick experi -
ence what I've 
mentioned above. 
However, I couldn't 
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and unbelief of other's 
certainty . 
5 confused at seeing 
' other's emotion'- -
physically as heart ready 
to burst yet feeling of 
lack in emotional 
experlence . 
1 felt a sense of 
responsibility. 
2 initial impulse to delay 
statement . 
E 
F 
do it. simply because 
that wasn't a good 
enough reason. 
3 D ~5!.~ living . And it 
came out spontaneously 
as I realised it. 
1 " Easy" I thought. Bu t 
then D took a long time 
in saying that he saw 
me as living. I had a 
moment of interesting 
curiosity. Maybe D 
couldn't say it. Almost 
an anxious feeling for a 
sec ond 
2 and then a feeling of 
balance again as I knew 
1 was living regardless 
of his hesitancy. 
1 A sense of dissociation 
from what was happening. 
Difficult to concentrate 
on a song and the others. 
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3 ' D was l iving' as 
spontaneous realisation 
,and verbalisation. 
1 initial anxiety in 
hesitancy of other. 
2 feeling of balance at 
conviction of living 
'regardless of his 
hesitancy ' . 
1 sense of dissociation. 
Constantly a feeling of 
just wanting to stand 
there and wait. 
2 When my name was called 
I had a sense of relie f. 
3 As the numbers diminished 
I had a wave of sympathy 
for the seeming lonely 
solitude of those left. 
When only one was left 
(R) I felt sad that she 
no longer had company. 
4 She was all alone in the 
world yet that very 
feeling in myself feels, 
at times, one of strength. 
I felt that it was in -
conceivable that she could 
have the same strength. 
But who knows? 
5 That feeling of random 
possibility. I was 
surprised to be called 
out so soon. Maybe I wont 
have to wait for death as 
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2 relief at being called. 
3 sympathy for loneliness 
of t hose left. 
4 aloneness of other as 
possible strength . 
5 experience of 'rarldomness' 
of being called. 
G 
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long as I like to think. 
6 Now writing this, I have a 6 in writing, life 
feeling of joy. Hell, its 
nice just to sit here 
knowing that I'm alive. 
I feel immortal , almost 
non - vulnerable --a n intrin -
sic joy of life that shines 
through every now and 
again. 
7 But death lS irrelevant. 
It involves both an 
accepting and a forgetting. 
But first the acceptance 
must be made tangible. I 
want to know that my 
acceptance is fuller. 
8 There must be more joy in 
this moment than I can 
even conceive of. 
1 Relaxation. A giving in 
to the pull of death. 
Releasing from life, 
lessening of museul ar 
tens ion. 
experienced as real and 
joyful, and self as 
immortal. 
7 death as irrelevant if 
accept it tangibly . 
8 joy in the moment with 
irrelevancy of death. 
1 relaxation and lessening 
of muscular tension in 
'release'from life. 
H 
2 The posture of deeth: 
Supreme comfort fOllowing 
from the release of the 
above. 
1 Dear Friend, So S has had 
it. I hop e he has f 0 un d 
finally the answers he 
was seeking. 
2 Nothing much to say, he's 
dead and that's it. It's 
a relief that he's not 
suffering in any kind of 
physical bondage. 
3 Death somehow doesn't 
make me emotional. I 
could indulge in self 
pitying ideas of lost 
friendship. But that's 
bullshi t. It does n' t 
matter. 
matter. 
It just doesn't 
Dead or alive. 
Black or white. But 
neither good nor bad. 
He is just dead. I feel 
the loss of his friend -
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2 posture of death as 
'supreme comfort ' . 
1 hope of finding answers 
by time of death. 
2 finality of death as 
relief of not suffering 
'physical bondage ' . 
3 event of death unimportant 
in itself but loss of 
friendship td one still 
living. 
ship but that's only my 
loss, and nothing to do 
with him. I'm sure that 
he's not hassling about 
it. From what I knew of 
him I'm sure he feels no 
sense of regret. 
4 He always admired and 
talked about Don Juan 
and the friendship of a 
death sitting on his 
shoulder. 
I 1 Death means nothing to 
me if there is nothing 
I can do about it. 
2 It is only an exciting 
and novel prospect . 
3 I n the life situation 
death is meaningful in 
the sense that I feel 
the struggle to be alive. 
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4 admiration of one able 
to have death 'as a 
friend. ' 
1 meaninglessness of death 
as an event because of 
lack of choice regarding 
its eventuality . 
2 death as an 'exciting and 
novel prospect'. 
3 death as meaningful to 
life as 'struggle to be 
alive' . 
4 I will fight death at 
all costs. I will not 
allow myself to be 
killed, by my own whim 
or others' whims but 
confronted with death 
with no avenues of 
escape, my resignation 
would be a joyful one. 
5 In terms of a Gestalt 
death means a finding 
out, and thus desirous 
6 But until that time l i fe 
is more meaningful and 
only because one day I 
will die. The certainty 
of my death is the only 
thing that prevents me 
from commiting suicide. 
I n other words, when I 
die, I die and that's 
cool. 
L. 5. 
A 1 My own death means to me 
that I can realise only 
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4 will fight death until it 
becomes certainty, then a 
'joyful resignation '. 
5 death desirous as a 
'finding out ' as a 
completion. 
life as meaningful because 
of certainty of death 
which prevents self 
from commiting suicide. 
1 death as limit to 
realising all her potentials. 
some of my potentials 
in my life. In this 
sense it means that I 
can never realise all 
my potentials . 
2 It faces me from 
moment to moment ... 
It means to me that 
he who hesitates is 
los t . Lost in the 
sense that he is not 
at that time 
·r:ealising ... 
3 Been faced with the 
immense possibilities 
as also intense futi -
lity . My own death 
means to me that I 
face annihilation and 
fulfilment from moment 
to moment. 
B 1 I wat c hed G's eyeballs 
and thought that there 
is life there, there is 
2 death as revealing 
urgency to act --
(moment to moment, 
hesitation) . 
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3 death as both possibility 
of 'fulfilment' and 
'intense futility' in 
annihilation. 
1 a.initially other 
appeared as living 
through bodily movement. 
motion and I wat c hed the 
rest of the body out of 
the corner of my eye and 
thought th a t at the same 
tim e th a t life is plenti -
ful , we ha ng on a thin 
thread to life-- it was 
espe c ia l ly the almost 
weightlessness of our 
hands that made me think 
this . 
2 I also thought that at 
times we were very close 
to an experience which 
was very close - -
3 1 felt , just before 
saying , " G, 1 see you 
as dy i ng ", that how 
cou l d 1 say this he 
was still here and that 
in l i fe one does not 
experien c e unto - death 
You ju st live . 
4 Then ':1 thought ... fa c e 
up to it . . . you are in 
the process of dying 
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b.followed by precarious -
ness of life noticed 
through'weightlessness 
of our hands '. 
2 interpersonal closeness 
experienced . 
3 immed i acy of other - as -
living inhibited 
statement . 
4 acceptance of other in 
' process of dying ' . 
5 and then I thought: ,. I 
wond e r if G thinks he is 
in the process of dying --
what exactly does he feel 
about it? " 
6 Then ,on saying it I 
thought that that ' s it . . . 
we d i e . . . we d i e ... 
7 and then just wat c hed 
it . . . the poss i bility of 
death. I t just seemed 
that it was so. 
C 1 I n the beginn i ng I had 
a flash of what death 
2 
would be l i ke. It was 
as though my body was 
not there but at times, 
as I thought of death in 
the sense of the end , I 
had a sl i ght twit c h in 
the left of my back at 
the top . 
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5 question i ng of other ' s 
feelings. 
6 with st a teme n t , de a th 
shared as ' we die ' . 
7 possibil i ty of death a s 
real i ty. 
1 distancing of self from 
body . 
2 bodily reaction as 
' twi tch' i n back . 
3 I became acutely aware, 
towards the middle of 
the exercise of G sitting 
opposite me as someone 
sharing the same fate as 
me and think i ng that he 
has so many different 
aspec ts to him but that 
we still both share the 
commonality of death. 
D 1 I became very aware of G 
as a hum an being. 
2 There was a good flow 
between us wh ich 
remained with us 
bhroughout . 
3 I beca me a ware of a 
slight tremor in his 
left and right hand 
when I said " G, I see 
you as living" and then 
the tremor disappeared . 
4 I felt that when I seid 
it , he received it. 
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3 other experienced as 
sharing 'commonality of 
death ' although different 
in many ways . 
1 aware of other as 
' human bei ng' . 
2 interpersonal contact . 
3 other's bodily reaction 
of 's light tremor' in 
hands with statement. 
4 experience of shared 
understanding. 
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ElI thought at the b egin ni ng 1 reflection of 'difference ' 
that it is subtly different 
saying 'I see you as living' 
rather than 'I see you as 
dying ' . 
2 I felt before G said 'I 
see you as living' that we 
are both living and then I 
thought of the pos'ibilities 
of living. 
3 Wh en he said "I see you 
as living", I felt like 
giving more life to him 
which I initiated from 
inside my being through 
my fingertips and also 
through my eyes in an 
imag inary type of way : 
4 and subsequently fel t 
life from him in the form 
of awareness of life 
flowing through our 
hands like energy . 
between present and latter 
pr ocedur e. 
2 immediacy of living a s 
shared by self and other. 
3 act of other as Ii fe -
giving to self led to 
desire of ' giving more 
life to other' through 
body as imaginary act. 
4 experienced life 'flow-
ing' from other 'through 
our hands like energy'. 
5 I felt that when he 
said 'I see you as 
living' that there was 
more life in his face. 
F 1 When we were all sing -
ing together I went up 
to three people, the 
first one being 5 . He 
was singing ' Mellow 
Yellow', and was lifting 
his eyebrows, smiling 
inwardly . He would 
c ock his head at inter -
vals a nd t hen wa i t for 
me to sing a bit of my 
song . I found that 
although I was trying 
to communicate to him 
to stop at times , as I 
wanted to sing to him a 
song , I didn't get it 
through to him. He 
stayed there and I moved 
off to R who was singing 
'Where have all the 
flowers gone' . I thought 
that see i ng that ·R in the 
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5 other as having 'mor e 
life in his face' wh en 
he made statement. 
1 description of socia l 
interaction and 
c ommunication problem 
past has not been 
receiving other 
person's communications, 
I would sing to him , 
whi c h I did until he 
stopped and even though 
I carried on and made 
my intention clear 
(that I wanted to sing 
to him) he moved off . 
2 I was also thinking of, 
while I was singing to 
R, what the others were 
doing. It seemed that 
even though here we were, 
all alive we were group -
i ng together for long 
periods and not 
util i sing the time we 
had to share with each 
member in the group. 
This made me realise 
that 'here I was thinking 
this while I was not dG~ 
what I thought would have 
been the best way of 
utilis in g that time. 
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2 urgency of inter-
personal interaction 
experienced. 
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3 Death seemed to come 3 death as coming quickly. 
quickly, 
4 but at the announcement 
- - - -----
4 a t announcement 'easy to 
it was quite easy to leave all regrets ' and 
leave all regrets, enter death. 
thoughts of the 
different songs and who 
were singing them behind 
to enter into death 
which did not come too 
suddenly . 
5 At times after that I did 5 after death oscillation 
find myself down into the between participation 
group in specific areas and withdrawal. 
such as attention being 
on the song but then 
wou l d find it quite easy 
to withdraw from this 
space and just lis ten . 
GIl at first thought : how 1 reflection on best bodily 
would one went to position posi tion for ' spirit' to 
oneself at death and then leave . 
what would be the best 
position to facilitate the 
spirit leaving the body. 
2 I decided that i f I could 
be in the position to 
choose a death posture, 
I would like to lie face 
upwards so that the 
spirit would leave from 
my feet, upwards through 
my body, and then out of 
my nostrils . 
3 Thinking about the motion 
before death, I thought 
about the birth of a 
baby-- thinking that it 
is a jerk as she c omes 
into the world. However, 
it seemed to me that 
possibly one would leave 
one 's body without a jerk 
if one was with one rs 
breath towards the end. 
4 This is a bit puzzling to 
me as possibly there are 
levels of motions before 
death (just before the 
spir it leaves the body ) 
ranging from definite 
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2 lying face upw2rds with 
release of ' spiri t ' from 
feet upw2rds through 
nostrils. 
3 with reference to birth, 
death as leaving one ' s 
body without a jerk if 
focus on breath . 
4 a.reflection on possible 
different levels of 
motions befcre death as 
r:physical jerks ', 'slight 
tremors 
b.and finally an 'ev en 
5 
physical jerks , to 
s l ight tremors to a 
slight movement and 
ultimately to a 
completely even-flow 
exit . 
I t wa s interesting to 
see others' death 
motions and death 
postures . R depicted 
In h i s death posture 
me what his attitude 
to 
in 
life is. It symbolised 
sp i rit returning to the 
earth (h i s body towards 
the ground rather than 
a wa y from it). It was 
inte r esting to see the 
symmetry of D ' s position 
and R's open type of 
position . I would be 
interested to know the 
reasons for the choices 
made . 
H 1 Dear Angelo , Death is 
the theme that is part 
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flow exit' . 
5 i nterest in others ' death 
postures as reflecting 
their attitudes towards 
life. 
1 aware of death as part of 
everyday waking world . 
of our waking world . 
I t's always with us. 
2 Fortun a tely I had 
real i sed this some 
time ago else I would 
have been terror struck 
or something like that 
with the recent death 
of my fr i end L. I 
knew her so well and 
a s we we re v ery c lose 
in a different sort of 
way , I would like to 
relate some profound 
meditations of mine 
c oncernlng her death 
and life . Actually 
what I am writing about 
even though profound is 
not so profound at all . 
Well , let me begin at 
the beginning . She 
di e d .. . th a t is one way 
whic h speaks of ou r 
fr iendship . 
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2 closeness of friend to 
se l f. 
3 She just slipped away 
with not much fuss or 
bother-- just a quiet 
mergence into the ocean 
of infinitude . 
4 as though death and life 
were to her like day and 
night--like the seasons--
they follow the pattern 
of the cosmic clock. We 
move from one to the 
oth er . 
5 We don't know where to 
bury her . She had left 
no message . They contacted 
me (the family) as I was 
close to her heart yet I 
do not know what decision 
to make . You see , 
although I knew her, I 
knew her not ... so it may 
well please her so ul to 
be buried here or there. 
6 How does one describe L 
in completeness? 
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3 a quiet death without 
'fuss or bother ' . 
4 death as part of a 
natural pattern 'like 
the seasons ' . 
5 indecision about pla ce 
of burial as indicating 
self as ultimate mystery--
'I knew her not '. 
6 concern of describing 
self in 'completeness' 
7 ... the one I knew and 
the one I did not know 
a nd never will . We climbed 
hills , swam in seas, caught 
snails and put them on 
roses and yet there seems 
to be no substance to our 
exper ience . She had the 
devil in her , I would have 
sworn at t i mes, yet at 
other times she was like 
an angel. Both were some -
times revealed yet other 
times were mild . 
8 And she knew me ... oh, she 
knew me ... I c ould be at 
home or in the fields and 
she was with me ... how can 
I e xp la i n ... it' s hardly 
expla inable . 
9 I could not love this 
woman as there was one 
sharp blade in her which 
lacked humanity . I knew 
that even had I sat at 
her table , slept in her 
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7 description of self as 
having two sides , 'devil' 
and 'angel'. 
8 had understanding of 
friend . 
9 possessed an unloveable 
an d unknowable side to 
self . 
bed, kissed her lips or 
run through the fields 
with her , Goddamit, I 
would never have known 
her ... and would have 
not been able to love 
her . Let not this 
sound dramatic to you 
my friend for a s this 
was so subtle a force 
that moved In her 
breast , it was real and 
it was for that subtle 
reality that I mention 
it . 
10 How cou ld I tell you 
more , yet on the other 
hand would rather not 
spe a k for a person who 
was but yet was not . 
I 1 It mea n s that I have 
plenty to realise now 
rather than postponing 
into the future . .. 
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10 experience of inadequacy 
of self- description . 
1 death as call to s top 
postpone me nt into the 
future . 
2 that I have potentials 
which when realised can 
be of help to others in 
building a better 
planet . 
3 I now feel more equipped 
to face life for in the 
face of death one can 
only but do the best you 
can by doing what you 
are doing (but as 
responsibly as possible). 
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2 realisation of potentials 
which can be of help to 
others. 
3 feels more equipped to 
face life by doing her 
' best' in the face of 
death. 
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4.2 Analysis into Essential Themes. 
4.2.1 Essential Themes of Sub~cts ' I nitial Refle c tions on 
' What My Own Death Means to Me' before encountering 
the Pr ocedures . 
(From central themes wi thin ' A ' ) 
Essential Theme. 
A 1 meanlng of death g i ves importance to 
acting and living now (DR6 , RJ3 , GI4a, 
(5Cl, 5C8) L52) . 
2a death as fulfilment of life (RB1, L53, 
(RJ1, RJ6)) 
b death as defeat and futility of life 
(RB1 , L53) --ambivalence between a and b 
in two cases. 
3 choicelessness of death as 'limit' or 
'r ule ' of life (GI2, L51 , 5C4). 
4 death as part of natur a l process (RB3, 
RJ2, GI4b). 
5 more afraid of pa in of dying than the 
fact of death (RJ5 , 5C6) . 
6 by the time death a rrives , a feeling of 
having grown or having sorted out meaning -
ful issues is wished (DR3, 5C7). 
7 death as the death of bodily existence 
and the beginning of a new phase (great 
link of beings) plays no role in conscious 
Number of 
different 
subjects: 
5 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
waking life (DR1, DR4 , DR5 , DR7) . 1 
Essential Th eme 
B I n a life which is intrinsically 
meaningless, death may offer hope 
in teaching self to accept life as 
meaningful for the very reason that 
it is not endless (5[2, 5[3, 5[5) . 
9 death as a riddle of existence 
( G I3 ) • 
10 metaphysical questions about de a th as 
a beginning or end unimportant (RB2). 
11 death as 'cessation of everything I 
am particularly aware of ' (G Il). 
12 feels closer to death at certain times 
during life (revealed as fear in one 
case) (RJ4, DR2). 
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Number of 
di fferent 
. __ -=sub~cts.:. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
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Own De at h Means to Me ' after Encountering the 
Procedures. 
------
(From central themes within 'I') 
Essential Theme 
I 1 Death gives mean i ng to life in terms of 
encouraging an awareness of the quality 
of liv i ng in the present arising out of 
death as a certain limi t (( RB3 , RB4 ), 
(L51, L52, L53) (RJ5, RJ3, RJ6 ) (GI2, 
G13a), 5[6, DR2). 
2 Ach ieve d i ncreased awareness of own death 
(RJ1, RB1, GIl). 
3 Death as an event is meaningless ; rather 
the problem of life emerges as important 
( RB2, (5[1, 5[3 )). 
4 Death as an event will be a voided as far 
as possible ( 5 [4, GI3b). 
5 Death i s welcomed as offering a possible 
answer to life (5[2, 5[5). 
6 Life and death are part of the natural 
flow of things (RJ2, RJ4). 
7 De a th i s we irdly i mpersonal (DR1). 
B Ther e c omes a t i me when the limit s of life 
as given by death recede i nto limitlessness 
(DR3 ). 
Numb er of 
different 
subje c ts: 
6 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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4.2.3 Essential Themes of Subl~ct'~~~ien£~~Each 
Procedure. 
(From central themes 'B' through 'H') 
Pro -
ce- Essential Theme 
dure 
B 1 Initial inability to see 'other' as 
dying (DRl, RJl, (SCI, SC2)(L51a, LS3)) 
2 Imminence of death or dying of ' other' 
became a real possibility (DR3, RJ2, 
(LS16, LS4, L571 RBI, SC3). 
3 Resistance to actively constituting 
'other' as dying (GIl, RJ3, 5C4). 
4 Felt distanced from other at his 'death' 
(DR2). 
5 Experienced interpersonal closeness to 
' other' with death as a shared destiny 
(LS2, LS6) . 
6 Felt ambivalence between distance and 
love towards other (SC5, SC6) . 
7 Questioning of 'other's feelings (LS5). 
8 Felt impact and gravity of statement on 
'other' (GI2). 
C 1 I mmediate bodily reaction to 'self as 
dying ', showing itsel f as a tense bodily 
mode ((RB1, RB2, RB3, RB4) DR3, RJl, GI3, 
LS2, 5C3 ) (focus on breathing as affirma-
tion of life in two cases). 
Number of 
different 
subject!2.2. 
4 
5 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
Pro -
c e- Essential Theme 
dure 
C 2 Awareness of othe r' s d il emma in having 
to c onstitute self as dy i ng (DR1, GI l) 
3 Achieved as escape from the immediate 
s i tuation of ' self as dying' by with-
drawal or focus on other or interactio n 
(L51, (5Cl, 5 C4, 5C5)(DR2, DR4 )) . 
4 Felt i mpact of awareness of death 
( (G I2, GI 4) 5C2). 
5 Other experienced as sharing death in 
c ommon which tempers their differences 
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Number of 
different 
subjects: 
2 
3 
2 
(L53) . 1 
D 1 Clarity of other be i ng al i ve i s exper i enced 
(explici t enjoyment of thi s in two cases) 
((RB1, RB3) DR2, RJl (GI3, GIl) 5C3). 5 
2 Experienced responsibility of constitut i ng 
other a s living a nd i mportance of communi -
cat i ng th i s affirmation ((5Cl, 5C2) GI2, 
RJ2). 3 
3 Exper i ence of close interpersonal contact 
and shared underst an ding ( L51 , L52, L53, L54) 1 
4 ' Other as living' experienced as distanced 
from self (RB2). 1 
5 I nit i al inabil i ty too see ' other ' as al i ve 
and real as he had previously known him in 
everyday movement ( DR1). 1 
Pro-
ce- Essential Themes 
dure 
E 1 Appreciation and well-being experienced 
at being validated 'as living' by the 
'other' ((DRl, DR2) RB2, GI2, RJ2, L53) 
2 Experienced dependence on being validated 
'as living' by the 'other' (RJl, SCI) 
3 MutualiDY of life-enhancement is 
experienced in both the giving and 
receiving of the affirmation of life 
(RBI, (L52, L53, L54, L55) GIl) 
4 Conviction of self 'as living' 
independent of other ' s hesitancy in 
communicating this to self (5C2) 
(experienced after initial sense of 
dependence on other -- see SCI) 
F 1 Enjoyment of participation in si nging 
(RB2, RJl) 
2 Regret at being called, experienced 
(RB3 (DRl, DR3)) 
3 Aware of group hesitancy before continu-
ing after someone' s 'death' (RB4, RJ2 ) 
4 At being 'called' to death, a distance 
of self from fellowman and a surrender-
ing of aspirations is experienced in which 
self becomes re - oriented by death ((DR4, 
Number of 
different 
subjects: 
5 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
DR5)(L54, L55) 2 
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Pro 
ce- Essential Themes 
d ure 
Number of 
different 
subjects: 
F 5 Felt self - conscious during procedure 
(DR6, RJ5) 2 
6 Emphasis on fact and quality of living 
as important in iteself ((GIl, G12) 
(5C6, 5C7, 5C8) 2 
7 Experienced a 'randomness' and 'sudden -
ness' in being called to death (5C5, L53) 2 
8 Experienced shock when significant other 
was called (DR2, RJ4) 2 
9 Structuring of procedure as 'meaningless' 
is contradicted by awareness of tautness 
of body (RBI) 1 
10 Fellowmen ' s ' deaths' experienced as less 
of a shock after the initial impact of 
the first 'death' (RJ3) 1 
11 Felt alone and certain of death in absence 
of any others living (RJ6, RJ7). 
(Loneliness perceived by other (5[3, 5C4)) 2 
12 Awareness of importance of interpersonal 
interaction experienced (LSI, L52) 1 
13 Sense of uninvolvement in procedure (SCI, 
5C2) 1 
G 1 Posture of dying as initial violent bodily 
resistance ((RBI, RB2) DR2, (RJ1, RJ3a) 
GIla, L54a) 5 
Pro -
ce- Essential Themes 
dure 
G 2 Posture of dying as an acceptance of 
death by bodily 'stretching out' (this 
follows previous posture in f ive cases) 
(RE3 (DRl, DR3) (RJ2, RJ3b) GIlb (5C2, 
5Cl)(L52, L53, L54b) 
3 Experienced 'profound will to live' as 
anger towards death rather than fear of 
death (RE4) 
4 Reflection on best bodily pos iti on for 
' spirit ' to leave (L51) 
5 Interest in fellowman's death posture 
as refle c ting their attitude towards 
life (L55) 
H 1 Evaluation of sel f and flow of life in 
positiv e terms (RE4 (DR5, DR3, DR6, DR7) 
(RJ2, RJ3, RJ5 , RJ71(GIl, GI 3 ))( withi n 
this, evaluation of difficult p ha ses of 
life and undesirable aspects to self in 
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Number of 
different 
subjects: 
6 
1 
1 
1 
two cases--(DR8, RJ4)) 4 
2 Felt death came prematurely i n relation 
to some potent i als (REI, RJ8, DR9) --
although time of death may also be 
viewed as appropriate end in two c ases 
(RB3, (RJl, RJ6, RJ9 )) 3 
Pro -
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Number of 
di fferent ce- Essential Themes 
dure . ______________ ~s~uc=b~cts:_ 
H 3 Chronological age as inadequate 
description of quality of li ved time 
(RB2, DR2 ) 2 
4 Death is viewed as part of the natural 
flow of things (RB5, DRIO, GI6 (L54, 
L53, L51)) 4 
5 Evaluation of self and flow of life in 
amb i valent terms (( L55, L57 , L58, L59) 
(5Cl,5C4)) 2 
6 Wi sh that others should not mourn death 
of self and thus validate life as being 
complete and meaningful (RB6, GI2) 2 
7 Experience of self -val id ation by be i ng 
remembered by a s ig nif i cant other after 
death ((DRl, DR4 ) GI5, 5C3, L52) 4 
8 View that life is given completion by 
death (RJ9) 1 
9 5urv i val of death is achieved thro u gh 
i dentification with the life- p r ocess 
and group purpose (GI4, GI7) 1 
10 Wi sh of finality of death as an end to 
any suffering ( 5C2) 1 
11 A c on~ern of describ i ng self in 
'comp l eteness ' is experienced (L56, L510) 1 
150 
4.3 Radical Reflection: An Essential Description of the 
Exper ience of Personal Finitude throu~h a Confrontation 
with De a th. 
(from Essential Theme s ) 
Th e experience of confronting death essentially emerged as 
two related concern s: 
(a) an or i entation or approach to death - as - an-event; 
( b ) an experience and sense of the meaning of ' my life' in 
the f ace of 'my death ' , i.e. an experience of finitude. 
(a) Subjects' orientation towards death -a s - an - event : 
emerged as ambivalent in.J;.he followinLwaY..§. : 
On the one hand resistance to death -as-an - event was 
This 
experienced (14, G3) . Im mediate bod ily resistance to the 
' se lf-as-dying' was experi enced (Cl, C4, F9, Gl); the 
promotion of re s i stance to death by participat i ng i n a 
shared dialectic with fel l owman wh i ch mutua lly emphasised 
life and de - emphasised death (Bl, B3 - B, C2, C3, CS , D, E, 
Fl - 3, FB, FIO - 12) ; the str ucturing o f death-as-an-event in 
euphemist ic meaning-contexts which lessens its i mpact, 
e.g. death as ' part of a natural pro c ess' (A4, A7, Ig, I S, 
I B, H4, H9) . 
On the other hand, an awareness of the necess i ty and 
possibility of re - constituting oneself and fellowman in 
terms of the imminence of death - as - an - event emerged (B2) ; 
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the constitution of oneself and one ' s life as being meaning-
fully co mplete by the time of death (A6, HI, HZ, H6, H7, HB, 
HIZ); the final acceptance of death through the postural 
release of the body (G2) ; the constitution of the tem poral 
flow of one's life a s being appropriate i rrespect ive of time 
as quantitatively measured (H3). 
(b ) Death as giving mean i ng to life in terms of i ts fin i tude 
emerged as the most unequ i vo ca l structure of death -
confrontation. Death gives meaning to life in terms of 
en c ouraging an awareness of the quality of liv i ng in the 
present arising out of death a s a certain limit (II, AI, A3, 
F6, AID, 1 3 ). Life a s a finite existance emerges as a 
uniform experience ir re s pective of individual viewpoints 
towards death-a s -an-ev ent . 
5 Discussion of Results 
and Conclus ion 
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5.1 I nterrogation of the Essential Themes of the Procedures. 
I n a comparison of the essential themes of the initial 
reflection on I what my own death means to me I (A) with the 
terminal refle c tion after the procedures (I), we notice a 
similarity in emphasis (death gives meaning to life) yet 
find more uniformity and improved articulation in the 
terminal reflection. Also the responses of three people 
in the terminal reflection (12) suggest an increased aware -
ness of the meaning of death. 
This comparison suggests three things: 
a) that the initial reflection on the meaning of death as 
giving meaning to life was reified and heightened through 
the procedures; 
b) that subjects changed In their degree of awareness 
concerning the meaning of death, although not in basic 
direction; 
c) that the procedures were such as to assist the subjects 
in their articulation of what death meant to them and 
that the initial reflection may be viewed as a reflection 
based primarily on an e x periential, lived - world context. 
The essential description thus reflects the initial and 
terminal reflections as being consistent with each other. 
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Looking at the procedures themselves , we see that definite 
experient ial responses to the procedures took place. 
Here, org anic experiences of resistance to death (el), 
the experiential movement from the inability of constituting 
fellowman 'as dying' to seeing this as a real possibility 
(Bl, B2) , app reciation at being validated 'as living' by 
fe l lowman (El ) etc., all suggest an experiential response 
to confro nting one ' s f initude. The terminal reflection on 
'what my own death means to me' thus arises out of this 
experience. Suc h experience had to b e i ntegrated with the 
subjects ' initial reflections and this may possibly also 
have contributed towards the consistency of the ini t ial 
reflections and la ter reflections. Here we see Man as 
operating within a historical lived -context where he 
integrates every new exper i en c e into his life. 
The answer to the question: ' Was an exper i ence of confront-
i ng finitude described or was a reflection on the meaning of 
death described', i s that one ca nnot really separat e them in 
this particular case. We find that one's lived experience 
is reflected upon a nd that one ' s reflections are also part 
of one ' s lived experience. The task of th i s phenomenological 
research was then to elicit reflections and descriptions 
whi c h were accurate descriptions of the subjects' experience. 
This was done by facilitat ing a means by which the subjects 
could get i nto contact with their experience in order to 
achieve as accurat e an articulation as possible. 
Von Echartsberg (1971) has gone so far as to suggest 'an 
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elaboration of meaning through joint enquiry' in which 
the researcher may assist the subject in articulating his 
experience. 
Throughout the protocols we find expression of experiences 
and reflections that are both shared and unique. 
A description of the shared experience as reflecting its 
essentiality has already been prese nted. However, by 
looking at the 'essential themes' section we notice a 
number of single -ca se themes which are reflected throughout 
the protocol of a particular individual . 
In D . R. ' s protocol, a consideratio n in both his initial and 
terminal reflection s on 'what my own death means to me ' is 
the theme that death is a beginning of a new phase of life. 
This did not change through the experience of the procedures, 
altho ugh an increased appreciation of the role that a 
confrontation of death may play in life, was realised. 
Thus there was a movement of focus through the procedures 
from considering the event of death as such, to a 
co ns ideration of the meaning of life in the face of death 
(read initial and terminal reflections of D.R. in their 
original form). His initial statement co n cerning death as 
the beginning of a new phase, was r eintegrated into the 
terminal reflection, although wi th a new emphasis. 
In S.C.'s protocol we f ind a person who considers life to 
be essentially meaningless. In both his initial and 
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terminal reflections, he views death as offering hope and 
a possible an swer as an end to a meaningless life (AB, 15). 
Death-as - an - event will also be avoided as far as possible (AS). 
A reading of S . C. ' s protocol shows that he i s a co mplex 
person to understand. Thi s difficulty i s reflett~d in his 
ambivalence throughout the procedures (see essentia l themes 
( 86 , E4, F1 3 , H5). S . C. nevertheless reflected the essential 
shared expe rienc e of the meaning of death and contributed to 
it s essential description. 
R.J. emerges as a person who accepts life and death as ' part 
of the course of things' (16, H8). Given this broad 
per spective, her concerns are prac tic al ones, i.e. the pain 
of dy i ng rather th an the fact of death (A5). She focuses on 
the i nterpersona l dimensions of death (F8, FLO, F2 ) and her 
fellowman may be seen to play an important part in her l i fe 
for se l f - validation (E2). R.J. 's protocol wa s fairly 
representative of the shared experience described in the 
essential description. 
G.I. was unique in that he achieved a sense of continued life 
after deat h through identification with the life-process and 
group purpose (H9 ) although death f Dr him was a "cessation 
of everything I am particularly aware of" (All). He shared 
with others the emphasis on the quality of living a s 
important in the face of death and therefore d i d not wish 
others to mourn his death (H6) a s this would be a denial of 
the quality of his life. 
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L.5 . showed great c oncern for the interpersonal dimensions 
of the procedures (Bl , C5, D3 , E5, F12, G5). She also 
exhibited an ambivalent attitude towards herself (H5) and 
a concern to describe herself in 'completeness ' (H12). 
Although having a dualistic conception of herself as body 
and spirit (G4) she did, in common with others , focus on 
death as a l i mit which gives life an urgent imperative 
(A3, Il). 
R . B. ' s protocol showed an essential ambivalent in a tt it ude 
towards de at h-a s - an - event (A2 ). He was aware of a ' profound 
will to live ' a nd a deep- seated resistance to death (G3, Cl) 
yet a lso wished to co me to terms with his death in a more 
acceptant mode (H2, H4 ). For h i m, the 'metaphysical 
questions about death as a beginning or an end' are 
unimportant (AID ), and, in a confrontation with death , life 
emerges as the important consideration rather than death 
( 13) . 
Through this brief a n a lysis of each subject's own un i que 
responses and experiences , the shared and essentia l n at ure 
of death - confrontation is contextualised within the 
historical flow of individual l i fe . We therefore notice 
that an y new experience i s re-integrated into one ' s total 
'gestalt' and that the subjects ' emphasis i n articulating 
their experience, is related to this ' gestalt '. It lS 
therefore postulated that phenomenologica l research should 
in accordance with the context of the ' lebenswelt ' 
acknowledge and e x pose the experience and orientation that 
a subject brings to the rese a r c h situation . 
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Having outlined the unique contexts of the experlence, the 
essential description itself will now be discussed. 
The most immediate thing which strikes one lS that the 
research situation yielded a description of the subjects' 
orientation, attitudes and decisions about death in itself 
as well as a description of the sense and meaning of their 
lives when confronting death. The research thus yielded 
more than a study on attitudes toward death. Its focus was 
more on the experience and sense of human finitude. 
It was not, however, anticipated that so much data on the 
subjects ' orientation towards death as an event would be 
elicited. This may have happened because of the open-e nded 
nature of the research situation, which allowed subjects to 
respond to the procedures without imposition on how they 
should respond. It is interesting to note that the experience 
of the sense of one ' s finitude was shared by all subjects 
although not necessarily called by this name . The essential 
description, because of its two related focci , l.e. an 
approach or orientation towards death as an event and an 
experience and sense of the meaning of 'my life' in the face 
of 'my death' , is essentially a description of what happens 
in a confrontation of death: both of the above happen . 
The prlmary situation was the situation of death-c onfrontation, 
and awareness of finitude emerged as the most uniform 
e x perien c e; but, as only one of its two aspects. 
An orientation towards death-a s -a n-event in itself also 
emerged as part of the experlence. Thus the original goal 
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of the research, i.e. the understanding and description of 
the experience of confronting human finitude through a 
consideration of death, was achieved and understood i n a way 
that was not fully expected, i.e. as only one part of the 
general experience of death - confrontation (the other part 
being an orientation towards death - as - an-event) . 
5 . 2 Evaluation of Procedures. 
------- - -------------- - -
The procedures which elicited the wides t variety of 
responses were the procedure in which a letter from the 
viewpoint of a close friend was writt en after the subject had 
died (H), and the pr ocedure in which the subjects were 'called' 
to death from their participation in singing (F). In the 
former case the responses were of a h ighly reflective nature 
and involved, in most cases, the consideration of one ' s life 
as a whole. I n c ontrast to this , those procedures which were 
more concretely experience- based (B, C, D, E , G) produced 
more uniform responses. I n the case of procedure F, where 
the subjects were ' ca lled ' to death, a number of things 
could be seen to be happening: i.e. the death of 'another', 
the death of 'myself', the experience of the social i nte r -
action, self - consciousness i n singing, and the randomness of 
being called. Thus a variety of responses are to be expected. 
Both , procedures which encourage concretely experience-based 
responses and procedures which provide opportunities to 
reflect on one's life in the face of one's death, thus pr oved 
to be contributory to the description of the total phenomenon 
of death confrontation . 
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The essential description of the subjects' experience of 
confronting death -a s-an-ev.ent ('a' in the essential 
descr ipti on ) was mostly derived from the experiential 
pr o c edures rather than from the initial and terminal 
reflections on 'what my own death means to me'. 
Here the immediate focus was 'death' as su ch. 
Th e essential description of the mean ing of death for the 
subjects' lives was derived mainly f r om the terminal 
reflection on ' what my own death means to me '. Thus the 
meaning of death was to a large extent implicitly evoked 
by the procedures and explicitly recognised in the terminal 
reflections. Thi s suggests that both the description of 
immediate experience a s well as reflection by the subject 
on the experience in terms of his/her total life-context 
must be done in phenomenological research in order to 
arri ve at a complete and contextual description of the 
phenomenon. 
Although the nature of the procedures were such as to 
encourage the subjects to extr icate themselves from a 
general social structure of death-denial e.g. '1 see ~~ 
as dying ', the essential description shows that there seems 
to be a deep - seated bodily resistance to acknowledging 
'death-of-myself'. Death -de nial was also encouraged 
through a mutual dialectic with fellowm a n which 
emphasised life and de-emphasised death. Procedure E, 
in which the subject had to constitute the 'other as dying' 
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shows that ~t is possible to d o this altho ugh it is no t by 
any mean s the natu ral o r preferred percep t i on of fellowman. 
On the re c e iving end (procedure C), the most un iform 
experience was that of an immedia te bod i ly rea c tion to the 
s t atement. I n only two ca ses wa s a n e xpli c it awa reness of 
the impact of death acknowledged. This suggests that the 
response was largely pre-reflective a nd , l n some ca ses , too 
threatening to consider s eriou sly . 
Th e essential description a l so. shows , however , that an 
awarene ss of t h e necessity and po ss ibi l ity of re-constitut-
ing oneself and fellowman in terms of the i mm i nence of 
death - as-an - event emerged . To this extent death was not 
denied and this resulted in the final and mos t uniform 
a spect of death - confrontation , i . e . an e xperi ence and 
sense of the meaning of ' my life' in the face of 'my death '. 
The research situat i on , that i s , the experiential 
proced u res as well as the reflections on 'what my own 
death means to me' re sulted in a des cription and in sight 
which would not have been yielded by a descr ip t i on of 
subjects ' reflections on death alone. It was due to the 
procedures that the subjects focused on death with i n the 
context of lived-situations; 
was more closely approached . 
thus the ' phenomenon itself' 
The researc h s ituation was only 
one possible situat ional context for the exper ie n c e . 
Confrontation of de ath may also be invok ed i n a mode of 
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existence where one is questioning the mean i ngfulness of 
one's life . Here , one may feel that much of what one is 
doing has little sense to one and, in such an experience, 
death as the final l imit and comment of one's life may 
confront one . More closer to home, the South African 
situation is one in which many people who have experienced 
a relatively stable and unthre a tening existence are being 
threatened by radical demands of change both from within 
and without the country. 5u c h in secu rity ma y more likely 
provoke a confrontation with de a th as the greatest threat 
to on e' s existence than a prev i ously sta ble existence, 
where all threats to one's life were pushed to the furthest 
periphery of one ' s awareness . 
The experience o f de a th-c onfrontation may emerge in many 
different and unique contexts . I ts essential nature, 
however , is postula ted to be expressed by the essential 
descript i on as outlined In this research . Further research 
in different contexts, for example, with those people who 
actually have death imminently on their hori z on, that is , 
terminal patients, may test this description. I n this 
particular ca se one must remember, however, to differentiate 
between experiences arising out of physica l symptomology 
and the ' re c essio n of life ' as outlined in the theoretical 
sect ion and an active confrontation with death . 
5uch resea rc h would therefore most profitably be done on 
those terminal subjects who are not experiencing ma rked 
disabil i ties due to their i lln e ss. 
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The present research involved a qualitative description of 
the experience of death-confrontation. A que st ionnaire-
based study would not have been adequate in reflecting the 
qualitative relationships, from the actor- perspective, in 
their context . I t would have allowed quantitative compari -
sons of the responses to the given questi ons between the 
subjects, but thi s was not the goal of the research . 
Questionnaires are most appropriate to a hypothesis - based 
study, where the questions are geared to proving Dr 
disprov i ng the particular hypothesis. Whereas a hypothes i s -
based study may be done on this particular subject (death -
confrontation), the kind of hypotheses to be tested would 
only emerge from an original phenomenological understanding 
of the phenomenon in question. An example of an hypothesis 
which may be suggested by the phenomenological description 
of death - confrontation is: People who have con fronted 
death are more present-centred than people who have not. 
This line of research does not lead to a holi s tic under -
standing of the experience of confronting one ' s death but 
rather, attempts to affirm one of its insights only ~fteE 
it has been understood. Thus hypothesis - based research may 
lead to statements of 'facts' and the proof of propo sed 
relationships, but this in it self does not lead to an 
understanding of these 'facts' and relatio nsh ips, i.e. the 
meaning of these ' facts' and relationships must still be 
understood. 
Thus, in the present phenomenological research, the 
meaning of what the subjects e~pressed was focused upon 
rather than its measurement according to preconceived 
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criteria. If measurement i n Ps ychology is attempted , then 
Phenomenological Psychology would here be concerned with 
the mean ing of the measurement, not according to theories 
but according to the experience of the subjects as a 
function of the internal coherence o f the lived-world. 
Th us a qualitat i ve phenomenologically-based study on the 
exper i ence of death - confrontation may suggest ma ny 
hypotheses arising out of the essential description, but 
would it se lf be the rationale of such hypotheses rather 
than the theoretical orienta tion and i nferrential skills 
of the researcher con c erned. 
A limitation of phenomenological research at its present 
stage is suggested by the status of the subjects in this 
research. The subjects were chosen because of their 
ability and preparedness to articulate the i r exper ience . 
I n a strict sense, the first phase of phenomenological 
analysis is the translation of the flow of lived-
experience i nto a linguist ic stream for communication 
purposes. In a research project relying on written protocols, 
one perhaps needs to rely more on the articulation of the 
subject s that in a dialogued situation in which the 
researcher and researched are involved in a ' joint 
enquiry' into the experience concerned. Here one would 
then have to rely on the artistry a nd skill of the 
researcher t o allow the meanings of the s ubject to emerge 
without too much imposition from the researcher's side in 
terms of his own experience and meanings . 
A possible problem with the procedures I n thi s re searc h 
i s that the s u bjects were receptive to them in various 
degre es . The fact that all expre ssed the e ssen tial 
description of 'what my own deat h means to me ', however, 
suggests that the procedures, though variably responded 
t o , were adequate f or the ir purpose (i.e. to provide an 
opportunit y for subject s t o c onfront their own finitude in 
a l i ved - context) . 
An i mp r ovem ent on this re s earch would be to find people 
w~o ar e be coming acutely aware of their f i n i tude a s a 
natural outcome of their being -i n - th e - world and to 
describe ~heir exper ie nce wi th i n the subj e cts ' his~oric21 
c ontext . r ~ ore l i ght IT.a y be thrown , not on ly on the 
ph enomenon i tself , bu t on the life - s i tuation which 
co ns ti tuted the exp er i ence . I t is bel i ev ed, however , 
~hat the present research did describe important profile s 
nf the pheno~enon of death - confrontation and as su ch will 
be in dialogue wit h other r esearch of this nature . 
In summar y, the following criteria of re se arch in an 
existent ial- phe nomenol og ical mode were fulfilled. 
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1. The research situation was a qualitative description of 
experience in a lived-world context. 
2. Essential themes were identified through their varying 
manifestations, i.e. both essentiality and uniqueness 
were acknowledged. 
3. Analysis of the protocols was concerned with meaning from 
the actor-perspective. 
4. The dialectic between approach, method and content was 
fulfil le d, i.e. the method and content of the e xistential-
phenomenological approach reflected and maintained its 
understanding of human existence. 
5.4 Conclusion. 
The empirical nature of this research was suggested by 
existential-phenomenological perspectives on the nature of 
human existence as outlined in the theoretical section. 
Sucb . perspective suggested that existence in its totality 
includes a 'death of myself' which may be owned in order to 
achieve an authentic existence (Heidegger) and thus by so 
doing, 'allow one's existence to speak to one '. 
The essential description of death-confrontation empirically 
validated this perspective i.e. death gives meaning to life 
as constituting a finite existence which may be lived in 
terms of such existential boundary. The essential 
description also showed, however, that the meaning of death 
as 'death of m:i..§.elf' and 'death of another' is in practice 
not always clearly differentiated. Oscillation between 
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death-denial and death-co nfrontation frequently occurred 
and Man may be seen to live largely on the interface 
between these two structures. To the degree that the 
subjects ' authentically confronted death, d i d they realise 
the possibility and necessity of reconstituting their life 
in the face of their death. They thus understood the value 
that death-confrontation may have for life and, to this 
extent, the research situation may be seen as an i niation 
for them. The most natural and socially validated approach 
to death seems to be 'death-of-another' and it may be 
postulated that such a meai,ing-structure is necessary for 
Man's present mode of living. Any rad ica l change to this 
meaning-structure would have far-reaching effects through-
out society. Politics, religion, and eoonomics would all 
be affected, but this is a subject for another thesis. 
If there is a message to this research, then it could be, 
that in fairness to individual life, a personal confront -
ation with death and the realisation of personal finitude 
is just as relevant in one's twenties and thirt ie s as it is 
in old age and in terminal phases of i llness. I ndeed if 
such confrontation were achieved in earlier life, our aged 
would not be as alone as they are now, so that we may 
maintain the myth of death - denia l . Further when the 
young become the old, the crisis and feeling of 
ontological betrayal at having to face death may not be as 
great because 'we were in on it' all the time. Thus, death 
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is not only for the imminent dying; death is for us all. 
Finally, some clin i cal implications of death-confrontation 
may be briefly outlined. It has been suggested (Angyal, 
1965; Laing, 1969) that chronic anxiety and neurotic 
and psychotic living arise out of a fundamental threat to 
thhcore of one's 'self'. Koestenbaum (1971) has suggested 
that such threat is a confrontation with 'symbolic death'. 
Such people are thus resistant to change of any sort and 
cling to any stable referent which they may find. 
Van den Berg (1972) has noted that a neurotic experiences 
an inaccessible future and an unintelligible past. 
Confrontation of 'death of myself' is an acknowledgement 
of ultimate and inevitable change and constitutes an access 
to the most distant future that one may have. It also 
encourages a perspective of one's life as a totality. 
Its structural mode of being is thus contradictory to the 
neurot i c and psychotic mode of being as outlined by 
Angyal and Laing respectively. This lS not to suggest 
that such people be directly exposed to a confrontation of 
'my death', but that an understanding of human finitude as 
an existential reality may throw some light on all modes of 
being human. Existential-based psychotherapy is concerned 
with the facilitation of personal responsibility (to take 
on that life which is yours) and as such cannot ignore the 
finitudinal dimension of life as given by death. 
(i) 
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